Exercising of media handling and management is a little discussed aspect of preparing any organisation in crisis management. From James Snyder of NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division, here is a great snapshot portraying its value, based upon NATO’s experience, in which CB3 has played a humble part:
Management of the media during a crisis is critically important — a lesson relearned from painful experience. What is less a matter of fact and practice is how to train in crisis media management, particularly in an exercise environment, for a large organization.
NATO’s Crisis Management Exercise (CMX) is a regular high-level exercise devised by member nations to test the organization’s crisis decision-making processes. It plays for a week and involves many players at NATO Headquarters, Allied Command Operations, Allied Command Transformation and national capitals. NATO has recently invited additional “partner” countries and other international organizations.
As part of the overall exercise, the planners have incorporated a vehicle to train NATO International Staff, international military staff and national personnel in crisis media management. We set up an exercise equivalent of our existing media operations center (MOC) with personnel from across headquarters and invite nations to contribute personnel to act as a press office during the exercise. Additionally, we set up a media simulation cell as a “red team” to operate against the MOC in dynamic play.
During the design phase, we developed a news media narrative that we planned to guide dynamic media content scripted by the red team, based on actions by NATO and allies and by the MOC, in both video and print form, which would also be distributed to all players.
We designed the media play to have a high degree of quality and diversity. In the most recent CMX, a traditional “road to crisis” introductory video was refashioned as a hard-hitting objective documentary such as one might see on PBS’s “Frontline” or the BBC’s “Panorama.” Immediate feedback indicated that this video was important for focusing high-level attention on the exercise and synthesizing the often complex issues faced in a made-up environment. Additionally, we found that our focus on production quality greatly enhanced the experience of the game players and the challenge facing the MOC.
This verisimilitude with a focus on media management training is not a usual focus in crisis exercises in our experience. This may be in part because it is not easy to do and in part because, by necessity, media simulation will diverge from exercise parameters. But this divergence is critical because the news media will almost always diverge from what an organization or government deems important in a political crisis, and it has proved beneficial to exercise this dilemma.
To help others develop strong media training models, I would like to outline three principles that helped guide us when creating our virtual media environment for the past two NATO Crisis Management Exercises.
The primary necessity in media simulation is reality: What players see should look much like what they watch on 24-hour satellite news broadcasts during a real crisis. Too often in crisis simulations the media format comes across as a video brief, spelling the issues out for consideration as if in a lecture. Otherwise, production values are so poor the players cannot suspend their disbelief long enough to take the scenario seriously.
In reality, the media take the situation with extreme seriousness, but with minimal exposition and with a high premium placed on narrative and imagery to illustrate — rather than tell — the story. The average news story, depending on the issue, is about 90 seconds long and is geared for a general audience, not a specialized or professional one. This general perception is what media professionals must contend with, and it is crucial for red teams to simulate such a reality.
Modern media coverage is driven by imagery. Fortunately, the Internet is awash with video and still imagery from a variety of sources, which can be used to create news media simulations. (Copyright concerns generally do not apply for a closed audience in a training environment.) Enormous creativity can come in to play when building simulated environments. Planners can develop locations and create characters and even corporate identities, such as NATO’s INN, our stand-in for CNN or the BBC.
Over the course of these exercises, we moved beyond the basic news broadcast format to involve other formats and expand a virtual media universe. We preproduced a business show that weirdly reported a surge in oil and commodity prices, which was “broadcast” just as those markets hit their peak in reality. We wrote an adversarial talk show modeled after BBC’s “HardTalk,” complete with a pugnacious diplomat.
We tried to think of the other aspects of an expanded media universe that affect our opinions. It isn’t just the news that makes impressions. Civil society gets involved, governments weigh in, and Hollywood certainly has its say. The war in Iraq has spawned more than a dozen films, including the Academy Award-winner “The Hurt Locker.” The war in Afghanistan has produced its own strange genre over the years, from the “Rambo” franchise to the recent blockbuster “Iron Man.” Even the former Yugoslavia spun off “Welcome to Sarajevo” and “Behind Enemy Lines.”
So for our most recent exercise, we edited a trailer from a Bruce Willis action film to promote a fake movie set in the exercise environment. A young British lance corporal produced an achingly effective humanitarian appeal that could easily pass for the real thing. We produced a tourism spot for one of the affected countries and an investment advertisement for another — both regular sightings for those who watch CNN International or BBC World News. Using our previous year’s material, we even made a spot promoting our fake INN network. All of this fills out a larger media environment. Together, it makes the crisis trainees aware of comprehensive forces at work and it gives the red team more to play with.
The media will generally approach a crisis and search for a story, or narrative thread: Who did what to whom and why. Whereas crisis management organizations tend to focus on the “what” part of that equation — the process — the media will find the “who” and ask the “why,” which is the narrative. Usually this question is impossible to answer for a general audience, which is what makes media management in a crisis so challenging.
It also makes it all the more incumbent on the red team to find and exploit this adversarial narrative in a crisis scenario. Properly exploited, the adversarial narrative could (and should) diverge considerably from the central exercise design narrative. In fact, our experience at NATO demonstrated that a public information examination of the exercise design forced a greater attention on what the planners really intended to get out of the exercise.
Examples of this divergence in narrative can be culled from recent experience. Organizations like NATO and the Pentagon focus on solutions; the media focus on causes and victims. The fury over the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico drew contrasts between BP’s corporate leaders and those whose livelihoods depended on the Gulf; the necessity of capping the leak and protecting the ocean and shores from an ecological disaster fell far behind in coverage. In other words, the government’s attention was on solving the problem, while the media’s attention focused on the problem itself. Crisis media simulation must reflect this.
NATO has benefited greatly from the participation of several member states in producing media for prior exercises. This has been crucial not only for the verisimilitude of the exercise, but also for the regional divergence of views on an emerging crisis. In many cases, NATO member states decided to build national-level exercise scenarios into the NATO-level Crisis Management Exercise. This gives us the opportunity to simulate a crisis scenario in a real physical environment, which is also a challenge. It is important to make the scenario look as real as possible by grounding it in a real place in a country foreign to the majority of players but intimately familiar to many of them. Given our resources, this cannot be done without close participation by the member nations. In one case, a central European country provided fully produced news broadcasts under the mark of its national news network in the local language. Dramatically written, it put into play a unique regional perspective that demonstrated the cynicism of former communist countries of official pronouncements on safety, given experiences such as Chernobyl. The Western European reaction was quite different. For an organization like NATO, reconciling dramatic divergences in public perception is a challenge in a crisis.
The more contributions we received, the better. There is never one single narrative on any one crisis, and trainees and red teams must be aware of and represent that fact. Additionally, this spreads the burden of complex and time-consuming work of producing high-quality media simulations to others, with creative consequences.
Today, the news media and public perception are inseparable from a crisis itself, but the media picture almost never matches the experience of an organization or institution going through the crisis. Creating this mirror world in exercises or simulations is critically important for training and preparing organizations and people for modern crises.
James Snyder is a member of NATO’s International Staff and has helped to plan two NATO Crisis Management Exercises. The original article was published in the Training and Simultaion Journal and can be found here.
What a Kafuffle (old English word) Wikileaks has caused. Governments are moaning and getting quite aggressive, activists are up in arms and getting quite aggressive, the media are stoking it up and getting more excited than aggressive – all wonderful stuff. People are taking sides and the noise of opinion, dissent, anger and outrage is pumped up to maximum volume. But regardless of whether Wikileaks is a good thing or not, whether Julian Assange et al are the new media Messiahs or Cyber-Satans, the whole notion of what Wikileaks represents and the impact of this new ‘cost-effective political action’ is worthwhile pondering.
Is the phenomena anything new? The capability to issue confidential information to a global audience – leak – has been gathering pace since the internet became a mainstream interactive information platform, or Web 2.0. Wikileaks itself is in fifth year and had garnered over one million documents within its first year. And as a phenomenon, the are other organisations akin to Wikileaks such as the Chaos Computer Club, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism and more recently openleaks and tradeleaks. Being an information guerilla is suddenly all the rage. But that’s the thing – it’s not new, it’s just become fashionable and has gained prominence in the mind of the public, despite being a fundamental part of the developing networked world. To those in smeared or embarrassed governments who have been shocked and surprised by this phenomenon, the question must be asked, where have you been for the last few years? And where they, and many of us, have been, to paraphrase BBC’s Bill Thompson, is ‘calling forth the network age, whilst carrying on in our daily lives as if nothing has really changed’. Wikileaks and all it entails is a fundamental and immutable fact of life in the 21st century information environment – that’s just the way it is going to be, rightly or wrongly. And alongside that will come a general recognition that information, whilst always a powerful tool, has become a lot easier to wield to massive effect, not only by governments and corporate behemoths but by the common man, sometimes called the ‘Whistleblower’.
Alongside this potential information tsunami, is the issue of privacy. What the Wikileaks phenomenon is doing for secrecy and privacy of diplomatic information (and let’s not forget also of corporate information) may have repercussions on personal privacy and our view of it. Facebook, wifi networks, internet purchasing, personal databases, google streetview etc have come under scrutiny regarding the breaching of personal privacy. If mighty governments cannot protect really important classified stuff what hope for me and my bank details? Undoubtedly many computer security consultants are already licking the lips in preparation for cyber-fortresses to be built to protect information. Despite the fact that it is a human being, not a machine at the core of leaking, via the internet or otherwise, will general concern generate universal measures over time which will drive the information environment back to the 1980s? Remember when there was no wifi, no USB memory sticks, no internet in workplaces, you still bought stuff using real money not electronic transfer? Are we heading back that way?
Perhaps not completely, but there will be no doubt some sizeable shifts as the potent mix of wikileakmania and IT security bubbles up. And then there’s cyber-warfare. The Chinese are often accused of being a menace in cyber-space, or the Russians when they close down It infrastructures of tiny Baltic states. Yet the activist backlash against suppression of Wikileaks – attacking Paypal, Visa etc – has highlighted another potent threat, one spawned and aided by a positive internet-age outcome: collaborative networking. Through collaboration, focussed around a passionate cause, a mighty army of computer-literate operatives, from Delhi to Dallas, can present a cyber-threat that maybe even the Chinese may baulk at. This may be slightly far-fetched but does indicate that cyber-conflict is not the preserve of governments or the occasional lone-wolf hacker and powerful counterinsurgencies have the potential to cause huge effect not only in cyber-space but on our daily lives.
The stuff that is being released by Wikileaks is undoubtedly of interest and in some cases has strategic significance, but is not necessarily all that shocking. What may be more of a shock is where the consequences of the Wikileaks phenomenon takes us.
Over the last 18 months, events affecting Toyota and BP have dealt catastrophic blows to the reputations of these two mighty companies. Poor PR efforts and, more noticeably, disastrous media handling contributed significantly the severity of their respective crises.
But the trials and tribulations of these global conglomerates seem far away from the dreamy spires of Cambridge, the tranquil Fens or the placid waters of the Cam.
Yet, as the successful companies of this region ever expand their markets, providing vital products and services increasingly impinging on the lives of millions, be they pharmaceuticals through to computer chips, the likelihood and impact of intense media storms in similar circumstances increases.
Of course, not on the same scale – there are few Deepwater Horizons across the Fens – but potentially devastating nonetheless. The poor media handling of a recall of vital computer components embedded in a critical system or medicines due questionable research can sink a small business providing these products. This is the volatile and dangerous nature of the information environment in the 21st century. Referring the media to the marketing department just won’t cut it. Unfortunately, anecdotal research of Cambridgeshire-based companies has revealed that predominantly communication issues are referred to … the marketing department.
The demands of such crises require people – real people not just twitter handles or blog aliases – to stand up and explain, inform, justify, defend and educate, and to do it quickly. Not doing so merely adds fuel to the fire and doing it badly lobs a grenade in after that fuel.
The notion that ‘the spokesperson will deal with it’ or ‘that’s something for marketing’ is sheer folly, as has been shown time and time again. Management, at the very least, need to be fully engaged in the media process and prepared, if necessary, to engage directly with the media. Further, if in crisis, a media interview can be a brutal event, both personally and for the organization. By not preparing anyone for such, any HR department can be seen as neglecting its duty in training its staff for their duties and responsibilities.
But why bother? Is it really worthwhile getting worked up about this? Two counter arguments are often expressed by small and medium enterprises. One: surely it’s all about social, new, digital media nowadays, not the good old-fashioned spokesperson in front of a camera. Two: we’re not BP. The national and international media will never focus on us; we’re just too small and therefore off their radar.
This is flawed logic. Regarding social media – all that tweeting, blogging, websites and the like – the marketing departments are increasingly getting involved in that, and rightly so. But in crisis, it is about people, not so much technology. People want someone, not something, to reassure them. Besides, it is that very technology which is paradoxically enabling the personal interface. The traditional media interview, once destined for the six o’clock news and maybe the ten o’clock slot but then forgotten about, now readily enters the internet echo-chamber, to be viewed and, more importantly, critiqued and commented upon, over and over again online on YouTube or BBC iPlayer, across the world, with interest fuelled by a torrent of Tweets and blogposts. New social media has made the skills of the traditional spokesperson even more important.
On the second point, technology now allows the ‘harvesting’ of ever more low level news by the larger media outlets, making the tactical issue a strategic problem very quickly. That technology has also enabled the citizen journalist. Further, the coalition government is rightly forging ahead with ideas for digital Britain, including major policies in opening up local media and, not least, local television. Technology is ensuring that, when it comes to even a minor crisis, there will be no way of hiding it, the potential of exacerbating it and the possibility of rapidly widening coverage of it.
Just as successful companies will invest huge amounts of effort in market research, R&D, branding, advertising and marketing, the lean and mean, the aggressive winners in the marketplace do not skimp on crisis communications and media relations. This involves having key personnel, not just the spokespersons, prepared and able to handle the media. If it comes to a battle for reputation, it will most likely be fought in the glare of the camera, and the arsenal must be ready, otherwise getting into the ring with experienced journalists will be a painful and damaging experience. It also necessitates comprehensive crisis communications planning beforehand.
Of course, not all organizations will find themselves in the media spotlight (although the potential is always there) and may not consider media training a high priority – a reasonable judgement call. But many, many companies can quickly be under the microscope and media engagement can rapidly become very critical to the future fortunes of a company, especially during a crisis. The speed at which this can happen can be breathtaking and by this time it may be too late to consider training. Those caught in such a media storm can then reflect on the fact that hindsight is a wonderful thing.
So, the bottom line? While it may take years to build a good reputation, it can be shattered in hours through the media, and relying solely on the marketing department or, if you’re lucky, a spokesperson to save the day on their lonesome or wielding unprepared and untrained senior staff and subject matter experts in front of the camera, is plain asking for trouble. Just ask Tony Hayward.
A few weeks ago Jeremy Hunt, the UK coalition government’s Culture Secretary, unveiled new plans for media provision in the UK. “We need to do something to stimulate investment in new media services that give a proper voice to local people,” he told BBC Radio 4’s Today Programme. He is seeking to encourage commercial public service broadcasters (PSBs) including BBC, ITV and Channel 4 to back a new generation of local TV and online services by making the provision of local sevices a condition of their licences.
There have been many moans and groans from several quarters, not least the PSBs themselves over the viability of these grand plans. Indeed it is proably internet TV, not digital terrestrial television, that is most promising in the local TV revolution. Internet TV also presents an opportunity for other organisations such as local newspapers and smaller niche outfits to get into the game. In a major sense this is already happing through digital convergence, as video becomes a major factor in online publication. There are already many local internet based news outlets using existing broadband technology. There has been an interesting comparison between two cities, one here and one in the US:
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx Birmingham, UK Birmingham, Alabama
This may be the trajectory we’re already on.
So the notion of Digital Britain charges on. But what does it mean for businesses and their handling of this media in the UK?
Let’s recap. Over the last 18 months, events affecting Toyota and BP have dealt catastrophic blows to the reputations of these two mighty companies. Poor PR efforts and, more noticeably, disastrous media handling contributed significantly the severity of their respective crises.
As successful UK companies ever expand their markets, providing vital products and services increasingly impinging on the lives of millions, be they pharmaceuticals through to computer chips, the likelihood and impact of intense media storms in similar circumstances increases. And with the approach of more localised digital media capability, that impact and likelihood increases even more. Well, that’s our contention anyway.
Two counter arguments are often expressed by small and medium enterprises. One: surely it’s all about social, new, digital media nowadays, not the good old-fashioned spokesperson in front of a camera. Two: we’re not BP. The national and international media will never focus on us; we’re just too small and therefore off their radar.
This is flawed logic. Regarding social media – all that tweeting, blogging, websites and the like – the marketing departments are increasingly getting involved in that, and rightly so. But in crisis, it is about people, not so much technology. People want someone, not something, to reassure them. Besides, it is that very technology which is paradoxically enabling the personal interface. The traditional media interview, once destined for the six o’clock news and maybe the ten o’clock slot but then forgotten about, now readily enters the internet echo-chamber, to be viewed and, more importantly, critiqued and commented upon, over and over again online on YouTube or BBC iPlayer, across the world, with interest fuelled by a tidal wave of Tweets and blogposts. New social media has made the skills of the traditional spokesperson even more important.
On the second point, technology now allows the ‘harvesting’ of ever more low level news by the larger media outlets, making the tactical issue a strategic problem very quickly. That technology has also enabled the citizen journalist. And with increasing decentralisation and access to media bandwidth for local PSBs, the camera will be ever closer to one’s business. The chances of that interview being required, especially during a crisis, are increased. Technology is ensuring that, when it comes to even a minor crisis, there will be no way of hiding it, the potential of exacerbating it and the possibility of rapidly widening coverage of it.
Counter-intuitively, digital Britain and the local TV revolution merely increase the need for good old-fashioned media skills.
You have been warned.
Shakespeare, Henry IV part 2, Act 1 Scene 1: Yet the first bringer of unwelcome news hath but a losing office. Pretty eloquent stuff (well what would expect of the Bard?) but basically in modern parlance we’re talking “Don’t shoot the messenger”. Bad news is often reason enough to feel like pulling the trigger, but just plain bad communicating is just asking for the metaphorical bullet between the eyes. So how can we try to avoid the bullet?
Rule one in ensuring an effective message is carefully selecting the appropriate words and phrases. Culture, education, gender, language skills, age, even things as nebulous as emotions play a role in the way in which words, phrases and sentences will be perceived, and that’s not even catering for the vast number of words in English which possess differing meanings to different people. Context and the syntax applicable to that context (the rules of the Queen’s English do not always apply) also have significant effect.
Simplicity is key, and especially in media engagement, where context, culture etc will be a much more amorphous. The more simple (without losing the essence of the message) the less likely to be misunderstood, cause confusion or, even worse, offend. And this is where your average technocrat, official, reasonably educated guy or gal, often goes astray. When writing documents, briefing panels, scribbling papers, especially in an official capacity, there is often a mesmerising desire to use distracting, confusing, misleading, obfuscating, imprecise wording (try reading an official document – corporate or public sector – you’ll see what we mean). Now that’s acceptable (to a degree) on paper, but not in speech. If the audience is struggling to merely comprehend the wording, any message those words should convey, are going to be lost. At this stage, the receiver may well, check the magazine for bullets. So, for simplicity’s sake, what to avoid:
- Slang, jargon or regional expressions, as they might not be understood by everyone.
- Abbreviations or acronyms unless well-known.
- Technical terms unless the audience is fully aware of the topic.
- Neologism (see point above*)
- Politically incorrect words (unless of course that is the objective and also remembering the context (some audiences may be receptive)).
Now, in public speaking often we can gauge the crowd and thereby the context, but it’s a little more difficult over the media. Simplicity here really is key. And being simple in the explanation of a complex issue is far from simple. It takes time and preparation and is as far removed from technocratic, business speak as possible. Some see rapport as a major player in communication, or a common ground between speaker and listener (or viewer). But when millions are watching or listening, rapport as such doesn’t exist (it may between journalist and interviewee, which can help (if the journalist is respected/liked by the audience)) and the common ground will lie in simplicity and ensuring that as little effort as possible is required of the audience to decode the words and ‘get’ the message (and then hopefully do something with that message). It’s worthwhile pondering here that giving a presentation is very, very different to giving a media interview – the mechanics of the former, we practice every day when talking with others, the mechanics of the latter (talking to one person, whilst actually trying to engage with thousands, even millions, through that person) are rarely experienced. Being a good public speaker doesn’t necessarily make media interviews easy – it could even be a hinderance.
* By the way, it means the use of newly coined words or phrases
Keep the ego out of it
As mentioned above, keeping it simple, stupid, isn’t all that simple to do in practice. And that’s often because of ego. We all naturally communicate ego-centrically – I’ll say it this way because if I heard it, I’d certainly understand it. Yeah, well, the message isn’t for you, it’s for your audience. Public speaking and presenting always involves assessing your audience and servicing their requirements. Those audiences tend to be smaller and, to a degree, homogenous. In a media interview, the audience is as heterogenous as they come. Of course, if you’re really up to the mark, you’ll know exactly what your objective is and who, of that audience, you need to convince or persuade to achieve it. If not, or you’ve got to carry the vast majority of the entire audience, then the communication, the words, phrases, construct, need to cater for the needs of the entire audience. And that means decoding your syntax into theirs. And the more heterogenous the audience is the more neutral that syntax, and those words, are going to be. Note, this is not about being neutral in terms of position or passion but in syntax and style.
So it’s got to be as simple and as neutral as the audience, not the speaker or interviewee, dictates. Otherwise, the gun’s hammer gets cocked.
But there’s got to be flair
Brilliant – it’s got to simple and neutral, and that’s difficult to do, especially with a complex subject or issue. Well, we’ve not quite finished. Simple and neutral is getting there but there’s a hitch – too simple and neutral and the audience will fall asleep, and that’s only assuming the journalist or editor has bothered to air what’s been said and recorded. Got to have a little flair, a little ‘sizzle’ to it. If it’s boring, it’s going nowhere – the media will shun it and the audience will ignore it. Both will go elsewhere for their information. Of course, credibility matters, but many will be claiming that credibility and the ones who can be credible but interesting with it will win out. And that’s not just about words but also in the way that their said, both verbally and non-verbally. If the delivery doesn’t have that something special, fingers will tighten on the trigger.
Words simple, syntax neutral, delivery exciting and all via a third person or filter, the joutnalist/camera – easy!
If it’s bad news, the messenger often gets shot, but by preparing carefully and considering the above, then hopefully the wounds won’t be fatal.
The purpose of this conference is to bring together academics from a broad range of disciplines with policy-makers and security practitioners that have knowledge and/or expertise that can facilitate advances in the study of Terrorism and New Media, particularly the Internet, in novel ways.
This is the first academic conference to subject the relationship between terrorism and new media, particularly the Internet, to truly multi-disciplinary scrutiny. The one-day conference (Wednesday, 8 September) will feature a series of panels and a number of plenary addresses. The conference will be followed on Thursday, 9 September by a workshop devoted to the robust debate and analysis of currently ‘hot’ topics in the realm of terrorism and the Internet, particularly the question of the role of the Internet in processes of radicalisation.
Call for Papers
We welcome papers or panels reporting on innovative research into any aspect of terrorism and new media. We particularly welcome papers or panels that report novel results or describe and employ innovative methodological approaches.
Papers or panels on the following topics will be of particular interest:
- Online radicalisation
- The Internet and recruitment
- Old terrorism and new media
- Methodologies for terrorism-related Internet research
- Terrorism informatics
- Network analysis and online terrorist activity
- New Internet tools/platforms and radicalisation/terrorism (for example, online gaming, video-sharing, photo-sharing, social networking, micro-blogging, online payment mechanisms, etc.)
- Violent Islamism and the Internet
- The content and functioning of jihadi Internet forums
- Jihadi video producers and content
- Children/youth, terrorism, and new media
- Women/gender, terrorism, and new media
- Case studies of particular groups’ use of new media (e.g. al-Qaeda, FARC, Hamas, Hizbollah, dissident Irish Republicans, etc.)
- Policy/legislative responses to terrorists’ online presence
- Critical responses to research on, reporting of, and governmental responses to the conjunction of terrorism and the Internet
- Ethical issues surrounding online terrorism-related research
Perspectives from any academic discipline are welcomed, particularly: communications, computer science, cultural studies, information science, international relations, internet studies, law, media studies, philosophy, political science, psychology, and sociology.
Authors of individual papers should submit a 300-word abstract at our proposal submission page on or before 17 May 2010.
A selection of accepted papers will be considered for publication in a special issue of the journal Media, War & Conflict.
Travel Funding for Graduate Students
The Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School, University of Southern California (USC) will provide US$700 in sponsorship for a graduate student to attend at *and blog* from the conference for the Center. Graduate students wishing to apply for this funding should indicate same when submitting their abstract.
The conference organisers are also in a position to provide a number of travel grants for graduate students. Support may be requested for transportation and accommodation. Students should provide a breakdown of the estimated cost of travel and accommodation upon submitting an application. Graduate students wishing to apply for funding can do so when submitting an abstract. Award decisions will be made by 14 June 2010.
- Abstract deadline: 300 words to be submitted HERE by 17 May 2010
- Registration: from 1 June 2010
- Decision on abstracts: 14 June 2010
- Decision on travel funding awards: 14 June 2010
- Early bird registration deadline: 8 July
- Hotel reservation deadline at conference rate: 19 July 2010
The situation faced by BP as the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico ran on for weeks with increasing amounts of pollution washing ashore was a collapse of its reputation due to operational failures in the original oil rig accident and the subsequent cleanup effort.
The stock price plunged as the oil producer, which can trace its origins back to 1908, faced a battery of legal and liability claims that threatened to empty even its very deep pockets.
Companies sometimes have to adopt massive and costly measures to stem the threat of reputational risk. In late 2009 and early 2010, Toyota had to recall some 9 million vehicles after a number of fatal accidents were attributed to unintended acceleration. The auto giant also had to suspend sales of several models while fixing the problems.
Banks, the quintessential managers of risk, have wrestled with the problem of how to measure reputational risk and how to safeguard against it. Many banks consider it an effect of failures in the three major risk categories – credit risk, market risk, and operational risk, says staff writer David Benyon in a specialist publication on bank risk management.
But operational risk itself was considered impossible to measure just a decade ago, Benyon adds, so that some risk managers anticipate an evolution in assessing and managing reputational risk.
Goldman Sachs acknowledged the issue in a filing earlier this year with the Securities and Exchange Commission after a spate of negative publicity about its actions in selling the mortgage-backed securities blamed for causing the 2008-09 financial crisis.
The “adverse publicity … can also have a negative impact on our reputation and on the morale and performance of our employees, which could adversely affect our businesses and results of operations,” Goldman said in the filing.
The Spanish bank Santander spent an estimated 500 million euros in early 2009 to make good the losses by investors in one of its funds that placed money with Bernie Madoff, an investment manager who pleaded guilty to running a Ponzi scheme that led to investor losses of some $50 billion altogether.
Sometimes these efforts fall short and lead to the company’s demise, as was the case with Enron and Andersen. In June 2010, the security firm Blackwater put itself up for sale after various efforts to repair damage to its reputation from actions in Iraq were unsuccessful.
A roundtable discussion at the Association of Insurance and Risk Managers in April found that risk managers overwhelmingly agree that reputational risk is important to their organizations, but only 6% felt they were leaders in this field.
While Toyota seemed on the road to recovery after its decisive action, the eventual fates of BP and Goldman Sachs remained to be determined in mid-2010. What was certain is that corporate risk managers will be paying more attention to reputational risk.
“Why chatter matters,” by David Benyon,OpRisk & Compliance, January 2010.
“A good name? Priceless,” Strategic Risk, April 1, 2010
According to the Times, BP said that its costs for the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico spill have reached $1.25 billion (£870 million) as it set out plans to place a second cap on the leak. Further, as of 1 June, BP’s shares had fallen by 13%, as reported by the BBC. It has lost nearly a third of its value since the Deepwater Horizon blowout on 20 April.
There is no doubt that the sheer severity of the Gulf catastrophe has had a monumental effect on the reputation of BP, justly or not, and the financial cost will be staggering. But with perception being reality, how much has the ‘perception’ of BP’s response contributed to the financial accounts?
BP’s engineers, along with countless others from several agencies, have worked tirelessly to stem the oil flow, yet still they are seen as the culprits, while the US government and its loose legislative approach to oil drilling in the area, Haliburton, responsible for the mechanical upkeep of systems that failed, and Transocean, the drilling company hired by BP, largely avoid the ire of the public. BP’s response has been massive, practically and financially, yet their efforts are all painted against the blame which is thrown at them.
The fact that public anger is concentrated on BP, and not others, may have something to do with the media response they put forward. It terms of crisis communications they have acted quickly and succinctly, as can be seen from their online work. But their words, coming from their spokesperson of choice, CEO Tony Hayward, have acted as a magnet for anger and distrust, not sympathy and understanding. And the question, albeit unquantifiable, must be raised: how much has the performance of Hayward in the media contributed to the financial hammer blow? 1%, 5%, 10% (even at 1% we’re taking lots of zeros)
It is ironic that Tony Hayward, a very capable CEO, has always been known for his aggressive approach to maintaining and raising safety standards. His experience in the field of oil exploration and the industry as a whole is (or should be) beyond reproach. But all that counts for little when dealing with a vengeful media, encouraged by a public baying for blood, feeding a crisis maelstrom.
The cleverest, most capable, experienced, sensible, respected, even honest, CEO is never necessarilycapable of dealing with a media storm. Such circumstances tend to be way outside their comfort zone, in an environment normally way out of their control. The angel of the boardroom may be adept at managing people, resources, time, finances and the market, but without considerable forethought, experience, and training in dealing with the media these management attributes will count for little, and may cost a lot.
Hayward has been castigated for his performance in the media – from wanting his life back, when 11 were killed in the initial tragedy, to claiming that the ocean is very big, when to locals that’s not quite the point. There are many other examples, in which Hayward has added (excuse the pun) fuel to the fire.
CB3, having looked into Hayward’s background and career, has no doubt over the honourable intentions of BP’s Chief, but if CEOs, senior managers, subject matter experts and spokespeople are ever going to face the media under such an onslaught, preparation, practice, mentoring and extensive training are utterly vital. Working your message (assuming you know what it is), reconnecting during interview, handing tangential issues, subtle bridging, persuasive techniques, linguistic dexterity – these are all cerebral actions which must be almost second-nature during the sparring of a harsh media interview, manifesting itself in a rapid mental obstacle course. Speaking confidently at the annual AGM, providing lively and humourous dinner party chat amongst other titans of industry, eloquently arguing your case in the boardroom – all good and well, but such attributes, whilst handy, will not enable the dynamics, strategy and tactics required of a crisis media interview (or any media interview, come to that). It is a different ball game, in a different ball park, in a different country.
In defending one’s reputation during a crisis, being seen to do the right thing is crucial but as Hayward has shown, words spoken in the media during a crisis can be very, very expensive, immediately and for a long time afterwards.
With recent claims from several quarters of the dangers of aid being mixed with military operations and the UK’s coalition government, currently putting DfID through a thorough review, dallying (or not) with bringing the two closer together, it is perhaps worthwhile spending a little time looking back at the short, but important, history of ‘military humanitarianism’.
The words neutrality, impartiality, independence and humanity pepper the pages of the manifestos, mandates and remits of humanitarian organizations and the volumes of academic and government discourse on humanitarianism. Yet, since the debacle of Rwanda in 1994, these classical core values have been under threat from a political ideal, that of ‘new humanitarianism’ which focuses upon a rights-based approach, as opposed to a needs-based one, is oriented towards long-term political goals of ‘liberal peace’, places humanitarianism within the ‘grey zone’ of a relief-development continuum, and is increasingly crowded with, supposedly integrated, political actors as it develops into a serious facet of international relations. The Kosovo crisis exemplified, both good and bad, the practical manifestation of ‘new humanitarianism’, but it remains a feature of contemporary humanitarian relief operations.
However, the post-9/11 environment has encouraged the militarization of ‘new humanitarianism’ towards political and security objectives, further straining the core tenets of humanitarianism.
Three major themes can be identified. Firstly, the public perception of the threat has changed, which has affected donorship; secondly, there came the ramifications of a new strand of political imperative, namely anti-terrorism and, thirdly, due to the nature of high profile conflicts, the conditions on the ground for humanitarian actors have been transformed, notably through the severe impact upon perceptions of neutrality and the hazards entailed.
Generated by a sudden sense of threat, donations to appeals for humanitarian crises were curtailed post 9/11, especially in the US, because of the notion that such funds were in effect aiding populations in which a threat resided. Further, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) sponsored the idea that the work of the US administration and humanitarian NGOs together ‘is now perceived to affect the national survival of the US’. Donor security in the minds of the US administration and the public became enmeshed with humanitarianism, encouraging a degree of selectivity as to where or not such aid should be disbursed and consideration of conditionality if seen necessary to bolster that security. Development aid has suffered a similar conflation.
US foreign policy, being at the forefront of the counter-terrorist agenda, dominated the foreign policy concerns of the West in general and therefore, to varying degrees, the humanitarian stance of the leading global donors. Policy focused upon the threat of terrorism. Like Kosovo, the promoters of major conflicts in this war, both the US and Atlanticist Europeans, have not shied from employing a humanitarian raison d’etre, mixing a political crisis with a supposed humanitarian one, motivated by political necessity
But the ‘with us or against us’ approach of such policy has taken the politicization of humanitarian aid, and the overt acknowledgement of it, to new heights. Impartiality has long been under threat as the aid figures from the mid-to-late 1990s have demonstrated, indicating a strategic skew away from what might be termed ‘forgotten crises’, representing something of a dual-track composed of strategically important crises and those less so. The very basis of the political imperative, centred on direct threats, has maintained such a strategic skew although shifting policy focus to new zones. This has had further profound implications for humanitarianism, not least for the basic tenets of neutrality and independence.
Afghanistan had long been seen as a protracted humanitarian crisis and therefore the humanitarian imperative could be more easily dovetailed into the political and military response to 9/11. However, Iraq was much more contentious, with neutrality being compromised early on in the lead up to its invasion. Many major NGOs, especially European ones, stated their opposition to the forthcoming war, their spokespersons not only commenting upon possible humanitarian scenarios but also their stance towards military action. The historical tendency for US NGOs mostly to align themselves with the incumbent administration reduced such an anti-war tendency but was indicative of their already lower levels of neutrality. The Europeans had shown that they could support military intervention on humanitarian grounds (see page 23) but their stance over Iraq illustrated their resistance to the conforming of humanitarianism to a political agenda. However, the availability of massive aid funds and contracts after the war’s end resulted in a reverse swing in terms of effective, or perceived, allegiance. While many NGOs, including US ones, initially declared their unwillingness to receive Coalition funds for work in Iraq, many eventually agreed to accept such ‘partisan’ resources. As such, in Afghanistan and Iraq, many NGOs are no longer seen as independent agencies but rather as subcontractors or, as Colin Powell claimed, ‘force multipliers’, in the humanitarian field. This perception enhances the notion of the privatization and militarization of humanitarianism.
The counter-terrorism agenda has raised further some significant questions regarding humanitarian policy. Many decry the merging of humanitarian policy with international security policy, even though it has been largely recognized that development and security are intertwined, with the former suffering due to a lack of the latter. But the new post 9/11 security environment has led to a much wider interpretation, leading to accusations that the humanitarian motives of donor governments and institutions have been hijacked by the underlying needs of their political and security agendas.
The post 9/11 environment has further encouraged the drive, apparent since the late 1990s, towards an integrated approach to crises, exemplified by the UN’s Brahimi Report of 2000 which formalized a coherent approach to crisis management, endorsing the ‘integration agenda’ whereby diplomatic, military, political and humanitarian elements would work to meet the same objectives. Further, the use of force, or even a benign military involvement in crisis response, has raised the spectre of humanitarian agencies operating, or being perceived to operate, alongside belligerents, with obvious concerns arising over the security of those humanitarian agencies.
Western governments that are involved in the war on terror agenda are also the main financiers of humanitarian funds. In this they do have leverage over humanitarian agencies and NGOs, which, at bottom, are resource-driven and compelled to search for funds, and to a degree over humanitarian policy.
Whereas Kosovo exhibited ‘new humanitarianism’ employing extensive military means, the last decade’s counter-terror agenda has been claimed as the harbinger of true ‘military humanitarianism’, on the back of political and security concerns.
Of note is the fact that while discourse around the subject of military humanitarianism was energetic during the first few years of this millenium, sparked by Iraq and Afghanistan, that conversation has waned over the last few years. But a quick examination of ongoing conflicts involving both military and humanitarian activities reveals that ‘military humanitarianism’ continues, for good and bad.
 http://hwproject.tufts.edu/new/pdf/minear-arden.pfd , p. 4.
 Andrew Natsios, USAID administrator, cited in Stoddard, A. Humanitarian NGOs: Challenges and Trends London: Humanitarian Policy Group (Overseas Development Institute), July 2003, p. 5.
 Rieff, D. A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis London: Vintage, 2002, pp. 234-5.
 ‘And I want you to know that I have made it clear to my staff here and to all our ambassadors around the world that I am serious about making sure we have the best relationship with the NGOs who are such a force multiplier for us, such an important part of our combat team.’ US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, 26 October 2001.
 Nickolls, J. Limits to Neutrality in Iraq Humanitarian Exchange No 25, December 2003. (pp. 7-9)
 Duffield, M. Global Governance and the New Wars London: Zed Books, 2001.