Exercising of media handling and management is a little discussed aspect of preparing any organisation in crisis management. From James Snyder of NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division, here is a great snapshot portraying its value, based upon NATO’s experience, in which CB3 has played a humble part:
Management of the media during a crisis is critically important — a lesson relearned from painful experience. What is less a matter of fact and practice is how to train in crisis media management, particularly in an exercise environment, for a large organization.
NATO’s Crisis Management Exercise (CMX) is a regular high-level exercise devised by member nations to test the organization’s crisis decision-making processes. It plays for a week and involves many players at NATO Headquarters, Allied Command Operations, Allied Command Transformation and national capitals. NATO has recently invited additional “partner” countries and other international organizations.
As part of the overall exercise, the planners have incorporated a vehicle to train NATO International Staff, international military staff and national personnel in crisis media management. We set up an exercise equivalent of our existing media operations center (MOC) with personnel from across headquarters and invite nations to contribute personnel to act as a press office during the exercise. Additionally, we set up a media simulation cell as a “red team” to operate against the MOC in dynamic play.
During the design phase, we developed a news media narrative that we planned to guide dynamic media content scripted by the red team, based on actions by NATO and allies and by the MOC, in both video and print form, which would also be distributed to all players.
We designed the media play to have a high degree of quality and diversity. In the most recent CMX, a traditional “road to crisis” introductory video was refashioned as a hard-hitting objective documentary such as one might see on PBS’s “Frontline” or the BBC’s “Panorama.” Immediate feedback indicated that this video was important for focusing high-level attention on the exercise and synthesizing the often complex issues faced in a made-up environment. Additionally, we found that our focus on production quality greatly enhanced the experience of the game players and the challenge facing the MOC.
This verisimilitude with a focus on media management training is not a usual focus in crisis exercises in our experience. This may be in part because it is not easy to do and in part because, by necessity, media simulation will diverge from exercise parameters. But this divergence is critical because the news media will almost always diverge from what an organization or government deems important in a political crisis, and it has proved beneficial to exercise this dilemma.
To help others develop strong media training models, I would like to outline three principles that helped guide us when creating our virtual media environment for the past two NATO Crisis Management Exercises.
The primary necessity in media simulation is reality: What players see should look much like what they watch on 24-hour satellite news broadcasts during a real crisis. Too often in crisis simulations the media format comes across as a video brief, spelling the issues out for consideration as if in a lecture. Otherwise, production values are so poor the players cannot suspend their disbelief long enough to take the scenario seriously.
In reality, the media take the situation with extreme seriousness, but with minimal exposition and with a high premium placed on narrative and imagery to illustrate — rather than tell — the story. The average news story, depending on the issue, is about 90 seconds long and is geared for a general audience, not a specialized or professional one. This general perception is what media professionals must contend with, and it is crucial for red teams to simulate such a reality.
Modern media coverage is driven by imagery. Fortunately, the Internet is awash with video and still imagery from a variety of sources, which can be used to create news media simulations. (Copyright concerns generally do not apply for a closed audience in a training environment.) Enormous creativity can come in to play when building simulated environments. Planners can develop locations and create characters and even corporate identities, such as NATO’s INN, our stand-in for CNN or the BBC.
Over the course of these exercises, we moved beyond the basic news broadcast format to involve other formats and expand a virtual media universe. We preproduced a business show that weirdly reported a surge in oil and commodity prices, which was “broadcast” just as those markets hit their peak in reality. We wrote an adversarial talk show modeled after BBC’s “HardTalk,” complete with a pugnacious diplomat.
We tried to think of the other aspects of an expanded media universe that affect our opinions. It isn’t just the news that makes impressions. Civil society gets involved, governments weigh in, and Hollywood certainly has its say. The war in Iraq has spawned more than a dozen films, including the Academy Award-winner “The Hurt Locker.” The war in Afghanistan has produced its own strange genre over the years, from the “Rambo” franchise to the recent blockbuster “Iron Man.” Even the former Yugoslavia spun off “Welcome to Sarajevo” and “Behind Enemy Lines.”
So for our most recent exercise, we edited a trailer from a Bruce Willis action film to promote a fake movie set in the exercise environment. A young British lance corporal produced an achingly effective humanitarian appeal that could easily pass for the real thing. We produced a tourism spot for one of the affected countries and an investment advertisement for another — both regular sightings for those who watch CNN International or BBC World News. Using our previous year’s material, we even made a spot promoting our fake INN network. All of this fills out a larger media environment. Together, it makes the crisis trainees aware of comprehensive forces at work and it gives the red team more to play with.
The media will generally approach a crisis and search for a story, or narrative thread: Who did what to whom and why. Whereas crisis management organizations tend to focus on the “what” part of that equation — the process — the media will find the “who” and ask the “why,” which is the narrative. Usually this question is impossible to answer for a general audience, which is what makes media management in a crisis so challenging.
It also makes it all the more incumbent on the red team to find and exploit this adversarial narrative in a crisis scenario. Properly exploited, the adversarial narrative could (and should) diverge considerably from the central exercise design narrative. In fact, our experience at NATO demonstrated that a public information examination of the exercise design forced a greater attention on what the planners really intended to get out of the exercise.
Examples of this divergence in narrative can be culled from recent experience. Organizations like NATO and the Pentagon focus on solutions; the media focus on causes and victims. The fury over the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico drew contrasts between BP’s corporate leaders and those whose livelihoods depended on the Gulf; the necessity of capping the leak and protecting the ocean and shores from an ecological disaster fell far behind in coverage. In other words, the government’s attention was on solving the problem, while the media’s attention focused on the problem itself. Crisis media simulation must reflect this.
NATO has benefited greatly from the participation of several member states in producing media for prior exercises. This has been crucial not only for the verisimilitude of the exercise, but also for the regional divergence of views on an emerging crisis. In many cases, NATO member states decided to build national-level exercise scenarios into the NATO-level Crisis Management Exercise. This gives us the opportunity to simulate a crisis scenario in a real physical environment, which is also a challenge. It is important to make the scenario look as real as possible by grounding it in a real place in a country foreign to the majority of players but intimately familiar to many of them. Given our resources, this cannot be done without close participation by the member nations. In one case, a central European country provided fully produced news broadcasts under the mark of its national news network in the local language. Dramatically written, it put into play a unique regional perspective that demonstrated the cynicism of former communist countries of official pronouncements on safety, given experiences such as Chernobyl. The Western European reaction was quite different. For an organization like NATO, reconciling dramatic divergences in public perception is a challenge in a crisis.
The more contributions we received, the better. There is never one single narrative on any one crisis, and trainees and red teams must be aware of and represent that fact. Additionally, this spreads the burden of complex and time-consuming work of producing high-quality media simulations to others, with creative consequences.
Today, the news media and public perception are inseparable from a crisis itself, but the media picture almost never matches the experience of an organization or institution going through the crisis. Creating this mirror world in exercises or simulations is critically important for training and preparing organizations and people for modern crises.
James Snyder is a member of NATO’s International Staff and has helped to plan two NATO Crisis Management Exercises. The original article was published in the Training and Simultaion Journal and can be found here.
Heuristics – we’re all doing it every day – basing our responses to information or stimuli on experience as opposed to cold, hard logic. It’s the brain’s way of taking a short cut to save processing time. Cognitive heuristics rely on several aspects, not least, representativeness and availability, and can play a huge part in our, or an audience’s, processing of information. And that can be pretty important in a media interview.
Representativeness is the mechanism by which the brain makes inferences about the probability of statements being true based upon how it fits with the receiver’s existing data, often responsible for stereotyping. As an expert in their field, a spokesperson will have much more available data and may assume that a message or statement is rationally understandable. But the audience may not have such access. As such, in message construction it is crucial that the audience’s available data, and thereby possible opinion, be accounted for. Equally important is considering how that data is informing that opinion.
The simplest example of this is the wine test. Even the most experienced oenologists (that’s wine experts to you and me) can be fooled by transferring good, expensive wine into the bottles of cheap, average wine and vice versa (even easier over a large group, but that’s another story). That’s because the all the available data, not just the taste, is influencing the outcome.
Availability can also change rapidly. For example, after a major aircraft accident, general public perception of the safety or risks of flying changes significantly, despite cool logic and probability calculations indicating otherwise. That’s because the availability of date ‘suggesting’ heightened risk is increased and the heuristic process short cuts logic, contributing to the cerebral outcome.
So, two lessons here. One: don’t assume that just because you’ve got all the correct data, the audience has access to that data – this is one of the cardinal sins of ego-centric communication. They may have access to different, even incorrect, data. Your message has to account for that (and remember, whereas good old-fashioned facts and figures are great for print interviews, they probably won’t survive the broadcast editing process unless you can sell them as vital and interesting). Two: try to access this data, understand what data networks are operating (not just what’s in the papers or on TV – the audience is getting much more sophisticated than that), so that your message can fit, support or subtly rebut this data.
All media interview preparation must focus on the audience. But it’s not just knowing about who they are, but also how they think (i.e. heuristically*) and where they get their information from.
* But even then, segments of the audience will be more rational than others, more emotions- or morality-based than others – men from Mars, women from Venus and all that.