The UK’s Unjust Libel Laws

The possibility of reform of the UK’s unjust libel laws appears to be growing. Indeed, the Secretary of State for Justice,  Jack Straw is hoping to push through the findings of the working party on libel reform, before the next general election. 

Our current laws create a chilling effect on the writing, reporting and broadcasting of information, when powerful concerns can threaten debilitating libel action against any who threaten their interests.  It’s not that the libel laws are themselves completely at fault but that they encourage astronomical costs to be involved in libel action, in some cases nore than 100 times more costly than in Europe.  The horrific costs of a libel case mean that losing can result in a legal bill running to over £1m (even if the damages are just £10,000).  The result is that the UK has become the top global location for libel tourism or even, as some have termed it, libel terrorism.

Libel Laws - keeping these guys busy.

The cases highlighted by the Libel Reform Campaign should add greater pressure for reform. The cases of Simon Singh and Peter Wilmshurst highlight the real dangers and distortion that the suppression of free expression through the courts can present to the public.  Wilmshurst is being sued in the UK by a US company, NMT Medical Inc, for an article written by a Canadian medical journalist and published on a US website. The journalist was reporting a lecture given by Wilmshurst at a major medical conference in the US.  Simon Singh was sued by the British Chiropractic Association after he wrote an article in the Guardian criticising the association for supporting members who claim that chiropractic treatments – which involve manipulation of the spine – can treat children’s colic, sleeping and feeding problems, frequent ear infections, asthma and prolonged crying.  As Bad Science author Ben Goldacre puts it, any law that stifles critical appraisal is a danger to patients and the public.  Most recently, Danish radiologist Henrik Thomsen has spoken of his fears of discussing his work after a subsidiary of General Electric claimed he had damaged its reputation by raising concerns about a product.

The campaigning done by Index on Censorship, English PEN and Sense about Science under the banner of the Libel Reform Coalition has led over 20,000 people to sign a petition and MPs to receive 7,000 letters and emails in just a few months.   Supporters include Stephen Fry, Lord Rees of Ludlow, Ricky Gervais, Martin Amis, Jonathan Ross, James Randi, Professor Richard Dawkins, Penn & Teller and Professor Sir David King, former Chief Scientific Adviser to the UK Government.

These, and other, cases present a clear reminder that English libel laws need to change. The US has already realised that there is something fundamentally wrong with our legal system and is taking action. Indeed, American states are now individually passing laws to protect their citizens from libel actions in the UK and as a result English libel judgments will soon carry no weight in America.

David Cameron and Nick Clegg are already considering reform of our libel laws seriously and the clamour for reform is being made clear from several quarters, not least the Libel Reform Campaign.

Information Operations and Influence Activity Symposium – 3 March 2010

Event date: 03 March 2010

Location: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Shrivenham

The ioia symposium is back for its third year providing a unique unclassified gathering held in the secure environment of The Defence Academy of the United Kingdom. This valuable networking context provides the main calendar event for the professional and educational exchanges between military and civilian proponents of Info Ops and Influence Activity in the UK and Europe. Last year we hosted over 150 practitioner and academic delegates from around the world. This year we will be seeking to build on this success to host a truly inclusive event that gathers diverse experts and their opinions from this growing and dynamic field of Military and Government activity. This year’s theme is Influence in Insurgency.

The ‘people as the prize’ puts influence at the heart of insurgency operations.  It demands that the application of violence be undertaken in such a way that the support of the public can be maintained. It necessitates that political, military and economic functions are closely coordinated for effect. It requires that every soldier acts in accordance with the values and aims of the most demanding of home audience and political leadership. This symposium will take stock of our thinking and practice in influence in insurgency.

In particular the symposium will consider:

• The degree to which influence is a whole organisation activity rather than a discipline of specific branch
• The extent to which planning processes and concepts are able to take account of the whole organisation approach to influence
• The degree to which the comprehensive approach can be viewed as an influence activity
• The extent to which intelligence is geared to planning influence activity
• The degree to which the military needs to, or is trained and educated to deliver, influence effect other than through the bluntest use of punishment and reward.
• The extent to which strategic and operational level influence should and can be delivered by the military
• The development of tactical level doctrine and concepts in influence.
• Operational and country updates

To register for this event please visit :
www.symposiaatshrivenham.com/ioia10

Publics versus Markets: Are they different?

An intellectual, but subtly practical, argument continues within the communications field – that which claims that, essentially, publics are not the same as markets and have to be treated in a different manner than that used by the marketeer.  This argument is has been epitomized by such communications scholars as Richard Varey and Phillip Kitchen.  Although predated by Grunig (cited in Varey, 1997, p.94), boldly stating that ‘marketing deals with markets and public relations with publics,’  Richard Varey’s argument, found in Public Relations: Principle and Practice, edited by Kitchen, claiming a definitive difference between “publics” and “markets”, sounds a note of clarity amidst much nebulous thought concerning the relationship between public relations and marketing.  Much of this relational theory accumulates around Marketing Public Relations (MPR) and Integrated Marketing Communications (IMC), areas in which public relations and marketing are effectively fused but yet continues to remain a subject of heated debate (Kitchen & Papasolomou, 2005, p. 150).

However, Varey’s argument is also premised upon several apparently concrete factors or characteristics which clearly delineate “publics” from “markets”, notably those of creational, chronological, structural, technical and organizational, as well as impinging upon the relationship between marketing and public relations.  By taking a holistic view of each and then delving into the details of their characteristics, it is intended to explore the nature of publics and markets and examine the credibility of Varey’s argument.

A brief review of glossary terms of publics provides several subtly differing definitions of publics, one of which neatly sums the predominant sentiment:

“Public relations terminology describing groups of people which can readily be identified as having some special relevance to a business or other organization, eg customers, employees, shareholders, suppliers and the local community generally.” (Hart & Stapleton, 1987)

Definitions of markets are much less frequent, although explanation of marketing as an activity is plentiful.  Even Hart & Stapleton’s effort in defining a market, is somewhat bland:

“Group of persons and/or organization identified through a common need and with resources to satisfy that need.” (Hart & Stapleton, 1987)

Relational definitions shed clearer light on what these entities are and, more notably, are not.  A key concept emerges pointing out that publics are groups of people that an organization is not directly trying to sell products to, and hence termed, in the marketing arena, as secondary target groups.  Yet, such publics are seen as influencing opinions about such an organization (De Pelsmacher et al, 2001, p. 247).

Throughout the research of definitions, wider reputation and understanding of an organization surfaces as an objective aimed at publics, and thereby the role of public relations.  As Varey himself observes, much of the effort of marketing, aimed at markets, consisting of advertising, publicity and persuasion through selling activities, is inappropriate for building and maintaining positive relationships between an organization and those publics affected by decisions or behaviour of that organization (Varey, 1997, p. 97).  Here, the core of the deeper identity of a public arises, in that publics have an interest in the behaviour of an organization.  Eighty years ago, Dewey recognized this in his seminal book, The Public and its Problems, defining a public as a group of individuals who together are affected by a particular action or idea (Cutlip et al, 1985, p.185).

A nice picture of a market.

This points to a fundamental difference between markets and publics; organizations directly choose their markets whereas publics are perceived to arise on their own in reaction to an organization’s activities.  Yet considerable debate exists around the creation and existential nature of publics (Tench & Yeomans, 2006, p. 620) and much literature views publics through an organizational lens.  Whether one takes the strategic perspective, seeing publics as message consumers, or dialogic view, with publics playing a major part in communication exchange, it is largely predicated by the fact that publics are effectively a construct of the organization’s making, if indirectly (Leitch & Neilson, 2001, p.128).  Regardless, there is substance behind the theory that active publics are created and maintained through a large degree of their own self awareness, albeit centred upon an issue raised by an external agency, namely an organization.  Dewey claimed that each issue, problem or interest creates its own public in which people face a similar indeterminate situation, recognize what is indeterminate in that situation and organize to do something about it (Dewey 1927 cited in Baskin et al, 1997, p.119).  Similarly Grunig states that ‘publics create themselves … whenever organizations make decisions that affect a group of people adversely’ (cited in Varey, 1997, p.94).

It is worth pondering this further.  The study of the emergence of publics is immersed, somewhat controversially, in Stakeholder theory.  Freeman’s definition of stakeholders as “any individual or group who can affect, or is affected by, the achievement of the firm’s objectives” (1984) encompasses shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers and the communities in which the organization operates.  Indeed, this is strikingly close to that definition supplied by Hart and Stapleton above.  In fact stakeholder mapping presented by Johnson et al (2006, p.181) in the form of a power/interest matrix, bears remarkable resemblance to Grunig’s representation of a public’s problem/constraint recognition matrix (Varey, 1997, p. 95).  Likewise, Cornelissen’s (2004, p. 62) breakdown of stakeholders in seven different types is reminiscent of Grunig & Hunt’s (1984, p. 145) identification of non-public, latent, aware and active publics.   These examples beg the question of what is the relationship between stakeholders, publics and markets.

To apply the marketing technique of segmentation to Freeman’s explanation above, one impartial  analysis could represent shareholders, employees and suppliers as ‘positive stakeholders’, in that they have a positive stake in the organization and a vested interest in its success.  In the free-market economy, customers or markets do not have a vested interest in the success of a company and in fact could support rival competition, defining them as ‘ambivalent stakeholders’.  And communities or publics, reacting to a problem, can be seen as opposing an organization’s actions, thereby viewed as ‘negative shareholders’.  Although this allows another example of differentiation between publics and

Ambivalent stakeholders ... ?

markets, it also ushers in criticism against stakeholder theory.   Legal status, contractual agreements, varying degrees of vested interest, differing needs and corporate governance all indicate the extreme variation of stakeholders, almost precluding the idea of one amorphous block.  The fact that different stakeholders, including markets and publics, are predominantly defined by how they affect, or are affected by, an organization presents a challenge to the coherence of stakeholder theory.

However, the examination of how markets and publics affect, or are affected by, an organization can be illustrative.  Markets are created, or affected, through the identification of a segment of population for which a product is or could be in demand (Grunig cited in Varey, 1997, p.94).  With commercial exchange being a primary driver, markets are actively sought.  An organization’s influence over a market may be severely tempered by competitive forces, yet communication is largely one-way and short term.  As such, markets, as major stakeholders, are frequently identified in accordance with their relationship to the organization, as a central raison d’etre.  Much theory suggests that publics tend to be created, or affected, in response to the activities of an organization, largely as a counter to those activities (although occasionally in support of them).  In this, publics are mostly not actively sought but the circumstances which may lead to their formation, dependent upon their perceived power, interest, problem and constraint recognitions, may be actively avoided.  Effective management of organization-public relations is largely two-way and long term.  In this, publics are often identified according to their relationship to communication, messaging and dialogue (Rawlins, 2006, p.1)

The creation of markets and publics leads us further into examining their structures.  Markets, as a manufacture of an organization, may be structured to suit the needs of the organization and its objectives.  Thus, they are defined by the organization.  Via marketing audience demographics or age-based segmentation, markets may be approached, or affected, via various means of advertising, promotion or persuasion to suit each segment’s characteristics.  Normatively, publics are formed largely outside the purview of the organization it affects, their structures dependent upon many extra-organizational factors such as politics, activism, the media, the existence and influence of opinion leaders, inherent knowledge, ethics and the depth of civil society.  Publics are self-identifying, rallying around a cause, often seen as grass-roots groupings.  However, that is not to say that less ethically-minded public relations practices cannot ‘generate’ publics to support an organization’s objectives, through ‘astro-turfing’ (Stauber and Rampton, 2004, p. 79)  Further, NGO’s may be seen as adept at formulating, or at the very least encouraging the growth of, publics, proving that organizations are perfectly capable of generating publics.  At a tactical level, however, it is noteworthy that the individual constituents, interest-groups, sub-groups defined in any manner of ways, of publics, and markets are not mutually exclusive.  One may belong to any number of defined publics or markets at the same time and may also be a positive stakeholder.

From a technical perspective, Grunig and Hunt’s Linkage Model (Grunig and Hunt, 1984, p. 141), developed from Milton Esman’s work of 1972, also provides insight into the defining characteristics of publics and markets.  By relating organizational linkages to stakeholder groupings, Grunig’s spontaneous public, akin to Dewey’s problem-identifying public, can be aligned with stakeholders connected through diffuse linkages.  Enabling linkages and normative linkages relate to control or regulatory bodies and groups with common interests, or publics.  Similarly, functional linkages represent input from employees and suppliers, also publics.  However, functional linkages providing output to retailers, distributors and consumers are representative of links to the market.  (Rawlins, 2006, p. 4)  As such, the enabling capacity, providing a ‘licence to operate’, and functional requirements, indicate a further difference between publics and markets.

This lot can also be ...

The chronological approach to examining publics and markets takes two forms, from a practical application viewpoint and also from an examination of contemporary history.  The former is typified by the notion that ‘good public relations lays the groundwork, creates the platform for successful marketing communications’ (De Pelsmacher et al, 2001, p. 248).  This implies that the successful affectation of a viable market relies on the effective engagement with, addresses the identified problems of and maintenance of reputation in the eyes of, a public.  Publics are ever present within the working environment of an organization, albeit frequently latent, although with the potential to turn devastatingly active, and ignorance of them prior to market identification and creation is likely to precursor failure.  Kitchen and Papasolomou (1999, p. 345) make the claim that ‘unsophisticated acceptance of market dominance ignores the volatile and hostile environment in which organizations function’.  Further they state that subsuming public relations into marketing communications ‘ also ignores the fact that non-marketing problems cannot be solved by marketing management and techniques.’  Further elaborating the linear process, they later (2005, p.142) state that:

“A company’s marketing activities involve a communications process aimed at achieving desired exchange outcomes with target markets.  However, in order to achieve this, the company needs to have trust and understanding with various publics that constitute the various markets.”

A certain tension between markets and publics, signifying differentiation, can also be seen as steadily developing over recent history.  Seitel (1992, cited in Kitchen and Papasolomou, 1999, p. 345) remarks that although traditionally marketing personnel have seen public relations as an ancillary part of the marketing mix, primarily providing the promotion aspect of the 4 P’s (place, price, product, promotion), changes have come about because of the developing nature of publics.  Consumer protests, especially over value and safety, product recalls, social needs, civic responsibilities and increased media scrutiny have all placed a greater importance upon the indirect effect of publics upon the maintenance of a market.

To elucidate more from the public-market relationship in exploring the separate terms, it is helpful to also look at the practices associated with them, namely public relations and marketing.  The definition of marketing as ‘the management process responsible for identifying, anticipating and satisfying consumer requirements profitably’ vibrantly states two key elements of markets and the primary objectives of marketing personnel: consumers and profit.  Within the corporate context, public relations practitioners, as reputation and relationship managers, may indirectly target the former and contribute to the realization of the latter, but only as a by product.  (Theaker, 2004, p. 5)  Further, the commercial focus of markets and marketing should not deflect from the fact that many publics are not necessarily influenced by strictly commercial issues and many public relations practitioners operate without recourse to any vagaries of a related market.  Special interest groups, political parties, religious organizations, charities and the public sector are examples whereby the concept of markets, as defined above, rarely feature but publics remain paramount.

The problem-centric notion of publics also tends to visualize a reactive stance whilst the organization’s perceived role in market-creation indicates a proactive one.  However, whilst marketing may be relatively positively targeted in its conduct, modern public relations, in its guise as reputation and relationship management, also envelopes proactivity at the core of its practice.  Reactive crisis and issues management, suggestive of firefighting those problems connected with publics, are only a part of effective public relations practice.

From the standpoint that, in corporate circumstances, marketing deals with markets and public relations with publics (Grunig cited in Varey, 1997, p.95), analysis at several levels can provide delineations between publics and markets (Coombes et al, 1954, cited in Kitchen and Papasolomou, 2005, p. 150).  Yet, as indicated above, contemporary history has presented shifts in the relations between marketing and public relations.  Amidst much debate, there has been recognized a move in marketing thought towards public relations concepts, resulting in notions of Integrated Marketing Communications (IMC) and Marketing Public Relations (MPR).  Examples of this centripetal activity are illustrative in Duncan’s (cited by Hutton, 2001, p. 211) definition of IMC as “the process of strategically or influencing all messages used to build and nourish relationships with customers and other stakeholders”, suggesting an increasing emphasis on understanding and dialogue with entities not necessarily connected to the profit mechanism. Kotler’s vision on ‘total’ or ‘mega- marketing’ further encapsulates the increasing comprehension that successful marketing relies upon relationships with markets and publics equally, remarkably evident in his idea of marketing ‘consciousness’ (Hutton, 2001, p.212).   This shift is inclined towards the full understanding of the same strategic objectives to which both publics and markets contribute, albeit that publics and markets may remain differentiated by how they contribute to those objectives.

However, the literature and various theories taken collectively reveal the underlying confusion of the identification of publics, due to definitional disparities.  Whilst, Dewey, Grunig, Repper and others position a public around problems and issues, typified by Grunig’s Situational Theory of Publics (1983), and forcing engagement and communication with publics into the realm of issue, or even crisis, management, a cold hard examination of various accepted definitions of public relations reveals a less adversarial basis for a public, upon which goodwill, mutual understanding, support and relationship management in a much more steady state condition are focused.  The former appears to base its definition upon conflict-resolution in which the public is to be assuaged, whereas the latter suggests conflict-avoidance to mutual benefit through dialogic engagement.  Indeed, following Grunig’s identification of publics, even the most unperturbed and lethargic of latent publics, inattentive and inactive on all issues, remain publics, somewhat contradicting the primary problem-centric definition of publics, which appears to espouse that if there’s no problem, then there’s no public!

The varying perspectives of theory tend to allow a merging of publics and markets.  It can be argued that both are entities upon which the future of an enterprise depends.  Both can be seen to have needs which can be satisfied by an organization.  The current debates of the exact natures of public relations, marketing, IMC and MPR are all indicative of the synonymity of the concepts of publics and markets.

All publics, even the ‘general public’, have the potential to be, or may be considered as permanent, stakeholders.  Sociologically and

... this lot, quite easily.

economically, publics form the environment in which markets can be created and sustained by an organization.  The nature of publics’ relationship with an organization will dictate the conditions of that environment.  Publics are not necessarily problem-centred and constant engagement with all publics, be they latent or active, is vital for the effective influence of an organization upon the environment within which it and its markets, exist.

Varey’s argument is that markets and publics are different and must be treated differently.  However, at the constituent level markets and publics are made of the one and the same ingredients; individual or groups of human beings.  At this level, a clear physical division between them is unsustainable, publics constituting markets and vice versa:  However, it is the very manner of their treatment, or how they affect, or are affected by, an organization, which makes them fundamentally different, not an inherent code or structure.  From an organizational view, it is what is intended to elicit from them that differentiates them; understanding from publics and commercial transaction from markets.  To subtly diverge from Varey’s argument, it is the fact that they are treated differently, to different if complementary ends, that differentiates publics and markets and from this key separation all other defining factors of difference between them are borne.

Bibliography

BASKIN, O., ARONOFF, C. and LATTIMORE, D. Public Relations: The Profession and the Practice (4^th Ed), Brown and Benchmark, 1997

CORNELISSEN, J. Corporate Communications: Theory and Practice, Sage, 2004

CUTLIP, S., CENTER, A. and BROOM, G. Effective Public Relations (6^th Ed), Prentice Hall, 1985

DE PELSMACHER, P., GEUENS, M. and VAN DEN BURGH, J. Marketing Communications, Pearson Education Ltd, 2001

DEWEY, J. The Public and its Problems, Swallow, 1927

FREEMAN, R.E. Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, Pitman, 1984

GRUNIG, J. E. “Communication Behaviors and Attitudes Of Environmental Publics: Two Studies”  in Journalism Monographs. 81. pp. 1-47, 1983

GRUNIG, J. and HUNT, T. Managing Public Relations, Thomson, 1984

HART, N. and STAPLETON, J. Glossary of Marketing Terms (3^rd Ed), Heinemann Professional Publishing Ltd, 1987

HUTTON, J. “Defining the Relationship Between Public Relations and Marketing” in HEATH, R. Handbook of Public Relations, Sage, 2001

JOHNSON, G., SCHOLES, K. and WHITTINGTON, R.  Exploring Corporate Strategy (7^th Ed), Prentice Hall, 2006

KITCHEN, P. J. and PAPASOLOMOU, I. “Marketing Public Relations” in KITCHEN, P. (Ed) Marketing Communications: Principles and Practice, Thomson, 1999

KITCHEN, P. and PAPASOLOMOU, I. “Marketing Public Relations: Conceptual Legitimacy or Window Dressing” in KITCHEN, P., DE PELSMACHER, P., EAGLE, L. and SCHULTZ, D. A Reader in Marketing Communications, Routledge, 2005

LEITCH, S. and NEILSON, D. “Bringing Publics into Public Relations: New Theoretical Frameworks for Practice” in HEATH, R. Handbook of Public Relations, Sage, 2001

PICKTON, D. and BRODERICK, A.  Integrated Marketing Communications (2^nd Ed),  Pearson Education Ltd, 2005

RAWLINS, B.L., Prioritizing Stakeholders for Public Relations, Institute for Public Relations, 2006

STAUBER, J. and RAMPTON, S. Toxic Sludge is Good for You: Lies, Damn Lies and the Public Relations Industry (UK Ed), Constable & Robinson, 2004.

TENCH, R and YEOMANS, L. “What Next? Future Issues for Public Relations” in TENCH, R and YEOMANS, L. Exploring Public Relations, Pearson, 2006

THEAKER, A. The Public Relations Handbook (2^nd Ed), Routledge, 2004

VAREY, R. “Public Relations: The External Publics Context” in KITCHEN, P. (Ed)  Public Relations: Principles and Practice, Thomson, 1997

Messaging sends the wrong message (part 2)

Without doubt the information age has brought with the idea of ‘real’ dialogical communication, in which the global extent of networked society has blossomed.  A quick history lesson in from the classrooms of public relations adequately plots the transition from the hypodermic method of communication aimed at a centralised model of society, through to the two-step flow approach focussed on a decentralised society and finally into the contemporary networked communication process of a distributed system.

Hypodermic to networked models

Amongst the vast majority of communication practitioners, and beyond, this shift is explained and celebrated by new/now/digital/social media.  So far so good – nothing earthshattering and novel yet.  But does modern day ‘messaging’ cater for this environment?

The very idea of a message – something transmitted to an audience, the very fact one ’sends’ messages infers indeed a one-way transaction.  But as we’re constantly informed by the social media gurus the new world is all about the ‘conversation’, dialogue, two-way communication, the community etc.  The notion of a message, purveyed hypodermically, is anathema to the new protocols and ethos of the information environment.   It grates against the sensitivities of the community involved.

Getting into a conversation not just getting a message out

One example is thst conducted by the Obama campaign forged around a slogan of ‘Yes, we can!’.  Throughout Obama’s campaign, in every media interview he gave, he embodied a sense that his ideas, his objectives, his desires, via the words and phrases he used were those of a larger community, not of a single man or entity, such as a future administration.  Less of the message, more of the idea.  His engagements with traditional media translated very well into the cyber domain, took place as part of a conversation and the techniques used, subtle as they were, allowed traditional media to converge with the needs of new, social media.

Does traditional media training cater for this change in the environment?

The output of a modern media interview is now one that is part of a wider conversation, one that is placed on the web immediately, directly or indirectly, inviting immediate comment and, if required, a response.  It’s not a one-off maneouvre.  But much media training relies on the interview being such a singularity – get your message out, full stop.

Much would be gained by interviewees being aware and being trained to treat their interviews as not just a transmission mechanism for their message but as part of a conversation.  This requires knowledge and understanding of that conversation, what it is centred around, how it is conducted, its tone and style.  Once again basic presentation is important – hands out of pockets, body language, dress code etc – but the timbre, wording, structure and emphasis are subtly altered, to align with the nature of contemporary information exchange and the format of the medium.

The media interviews of old for TV, radio or print are still relevant and require specific techniques.  But more frequently these interviews form part of a wider format of communication, relying less on the message and more on the conversation.

U.S. Diplomacy in the Age of Facebook and Twitter: An Address on 21st Century Statecraft

The current revolution in communications technologies and the emergence of new media platforms are transforming the practice of American foreign policy. Today’s diplomats are seeking ways to exploit new tools such as social media, short message service (SMS), and other mobile applications on the more than 4.6 billion mobile phones in use around the world. To respond to this changing environment, the U.S. State Department, under the leadership of Secretary Hillary Clinton, is exploring new avenues in 21st century statecraft, seeking to maximize the potential of these technologies in service of America’s diplomatic and development goals.

On December 17, the Brookings Institution will host Alec Ross, the secretary of state’s senior advisor for innovation, for a discussion of these new tools of diplomacy.  Before joining the State Department, Ross served as convener for technology, media and telecommunications policy for Barack Obama’s presidential campaign. Previously, Ross helped lead One Economy, a nonprofit organization addressing the digital divide.

Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Kristin Lord, vice president of the Center for a New American Security, will join the discussion following Mr. Ross’s opening remarks. Brookings Senior Fellow Theodore Piccone, deputy director for Foreign Policy, will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion. After the program, panelists will take audience questions.

Event Information

When

Thursday, December 17, 2009
10:30 AM to 11:45 AM

Where

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

Contact: Brookings Office of Communications

E-mail: events@brookings.edu

Phone: 202.797.6105

Messaging sends the wrong message (Part 1)

Get one’s message across … keep on message … get our message through …

When it comes to media training, marketing, corporate communication, PR and the like, there remains an annoying and unhealthy preoccupation with the idea of  ‘the message’.  The very idea of crafting a message and then ‘getting it across’ is, in the information age, a little out of date.

Standard media training - only scratching the surface of achieving one's objective

One can have the finest message, distribute it widely, have it heard by millions, even understood by many of them but this merely scratches the surface of the human psychological condition.  It may, at best, stimulate the cognitive process – as in the audience may well become aware of the message.  However, mental activity is a little more nuanced than that.

The great philosophers of ancient times, including Plato and Aristotle, recognised various levels of mental processing, mostly founded around three levels.   These levels became philosophically clearer in the 18th Century – to be known as the three-faculty concept.  As Immanuel Kant observed “There are three absolutely irreducible faculties of the mind, namely, knowledge, feeling, and desire”.    Put another way, three levels of mental faculty can be explained as:

Cognitive – in which we possess thought, intellect or cognition

Affective – in which we feel pleasures, emotions, passion, affection, sentiment

Conative – in which we have the will to act as directed by our feelings

All clever stuff, which many, many clever men and women have researched, ruminated over and written about.  However, for the simple communicator there is also much food for thought.  The cognitive level allows for awareness of and thought about a message.  This is good as far as it goes.  But the mere message does not guarantee a specific affective condition, i.e. an attitude.  Nor does it necessarily encourage a conative response, i.e. an action.

There are a multitude of defintions of what communication is but, at heart, communication is defined by the response one gets from it.  By concentrating on the message,  you are aiming at a cognitive response.  But if you want the audience to do something – by a product, stop drink-driving, support a charity, lay down their weapons – then the communicator has to go way beyond thinking in terms of a message, and focusing much more on desired action.

Now, most good communicators are well aware of this – although they may use other terms, couch it differently, present an alternative framework.  But even in its simplest (but important) manifestation of media training, most are concerned heavily with the message and not the level of response.  Going on camera or on radio or in print, one can indeed be trained to get one’s message across loud and clear.  But 99.9% of the time it is a response, not just the knowledge or awareness, that an interviewee is after.  That is the objective.

Fred the Great - partial to potato pies with chips, followed by crisps

An example, cited by Ogilvy’s Rory Sutherland, is of Frederick the Great’s attempts to get the Prussian people to grow potatoes, in order to create a comprehensive economy less susceptible to famine – the response required being the extensive growth of potatoes by the population.  The practice was made compulsory via edicts, orders and legal procedures – the message being ‘grow potatoes’.  However, the average 18th century Prussian much preferred bread as a staple dietary requirement, growing wheat instead, and took little notice of the King’s demands.  A change of tack resulted in the King then proclaiming the potato to be a Royal vegetable, planted only for Royal consumption – the message being ‘potatoes are for Royalty only’.  Needless to say, within months there was a huge underground potato market which eventually became part of the mainstream economy – the response initially desired.  Now, this is fairly marketing-centric but the notion that the response is more important than the message is adequately highlighted.

CB3 is keen on taking this approach, especially in media training.  Speaking clearly, looking at the camera, not picking your nose, bridging to your message etc – the usual components of media training – is all very well but focusing on the objective (the response), via the three-faculty concept, and less on the message goes a long way to achieving one’s actual aims.

But if you merely want to get your ‘message’ across … well, that’s your business.

Sobering statistics for social media

A recent study, by TLG Communications, presents sobering reading for all those social/digtal/new (or even ‘now’) media  gurus out there.

A poll of 1,000 opinion leaders found radio had more influence than any other media on corporate reputation. Television came second and print third, while online languished in fourth place.

IPlayer - Digital convergence keeping traditional forms alive and thriving.

It’s a timely reminder that even in the technology-saturated West the older, more traditional forms of communication still have considerable sway and relevance.  In fact, if anything, new technology, such as iPlayer, have given radio and mainstream television an added boost.  TLG founder Malcolm Gooderham said:

“This year, for the first time, we have surveyed the influence of different med­ia on brand reputation. Given the prevalence of new media companies being nominated as thought leaders, it may be surprising that the overwhelming winner in the med­ia category is old ­media, and almost 100 years old at that.”

Digital convergence is still the main factor in the transformation of the communication environment but it’s worthwhile remembering that this convergence is of new and old media, not the birth of a totally unique phenomena at the expense of what has gone before.

As Clay Shirky adeptly explained at a TED Talk earlier this year:

“The media that is good at creating conversations is no good at creating groups. And that’s good at creating groups is no good at creating conversations. … The Internet is the first medium in history that has native support for groups and conversation at the same time. Where as the phone gave us the one to one pattern. And television, radio, magazines, books, gave us the one to many pattern. The Internet gives us the many to many pattern. For the first time media is natively good at supporting these kinds of conversations.”

The good old wireless ... a bit smaller now and less like a Dalek, but popular nevertheless.

Just so, but we humans are still tuned into the big message coming from the central hub.  The way we source our information, and thereby create our ‘worldviews’ and form our opinions, is changing rapidly.  The online communities still tend to form their conversations around what has been despatched via a traditional system, excepting the occasional on-line viral successes.  As long as power structure still feature a degree of centrality, regardless of the shift of power, the traditional forms of communication, aided and abetted by digital technology, will remain a focus and the likes of BBC News at Ten and Channel 4 News will still play a major role in the structure of society.

Long live new media, but may old media never die.

Strategic Communication: The Organizational Challenge

A strong case can be made that contemporary strategic communications, as ‘synchronized coordination of statecraft, public affairs, public diplomacy, military information operations, and other activities’[1], is failing to achieve its potential at the national level due to organizational failings as well as problems within its constituent parts.

Yet, there are specific areas which are immediately recognised as impediments, notably organizational and managerial issues.  At a major US-UK conference in late 2005, examining information effects in counter-insurgency and stability operations, senior military and civilian personnel rounded upon the managerial aspects of communications and information:

Participants concurred that “we should all work together,” but recognized that strong organizational challenges remain. Participants agreed that the military needs clear strategic guidance on the proposed end-state and overall information strategy to effectively fight the informational fight. However, this strategic vision sometimes has been lacking, which has meant that, by default, the military was shaping policy through its actions on the ground. Many also thought that overall coordination mechanisms are lacking.[2]

Do fancy diagrams like this really address the organizational challenge?

Organizational structure and managerial capabilities in civil-military interventions may be seen as being hampering the communication function through their functionality being framed through an industrial warfare perspective:

[T]he traditional kinetic focus of U.S. military operations often jeopardizes communication-based shaping efforts.  U.S. forces are trained primarily for kinetic operations and inflicting casualties on an enemy, not for shaping noncombatant attitudes. Both force structure and mind-set can be incompatible with shaping goals.[3]

US military doctrine is pervasive throughout most militaries operating in multi-lateral civil-military interventions and thus structures, management and ethos are often replicated.

Corncerns over organizational and managerial issues at the senior levels of strategic communication, have also been raised before.  Once again taking the US example, the DSB reported in 2008:

Nevertheless, the task force finds reasons for continued concern.  Positive changes within organizations are real, but they depend to a considerable extent on the skills and imagination of current leaders.  These changes must be evaluated, and those that work should be institutionalized. Resistance from traditional organizational cultures continues. Resources for strategic communication have increased, but they fall substantially short of national needs.  This task force’s primary concern is that fundamental transformation in strategic communication has not occurred at the strategic and interagency level.[4]

Within this management challenge is the continuing top-down management processes within the foreign policy process, out of kilter with the contemporary information environment.  Faced with a rapidly changing environment, with regard to public diplomacy, Cull claims:

none of these changes is as challenging as the reorientation of public diplomacy away from the top-down communication patterns of the Cold War era[5]

Equally, the continuing disconnect between communication efforts and policy, also present an organizational and managerial challenge.  This is nothing new, as Edward R Murrow pointed out in the 1960s, famously claiming that communication personnel had to be ‘in on the take-offs of policy’ if it was going to be expected to be ‘in on the crash landings’.   As Cull, re-iterates:

[T]he most important link in any public diplomacy structure is that which connects ‘listening’ to policy-making and ensures that foreign opinion is weighed in the foreign policy process.[6]

It is therefore seen that there are problems within multilateral communications and many of these are attributed to managerial and organizational issues.  An examinination of those specific organizational and managerial aspects of multilateral communicative efforts during civil-military foreign policy interventions is well overdue.  This work would not be done without precedent; much has been done in the corporate world, but there is little evidence of deep analysis of communications management or organization against the backdrop of corporate lessons learnt.

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[1] Jones,J. B., “Strategic Communication: A Mandate for the United States,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue Thirty-nine (Fourth Quarter 2005), p. 109.

 

[2] Collings, D. & Rohozinski, R., “Shifting Fire: Information Effects in Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations” , US Army War College (2006), p.12

[3] Helmus, T.C., Paul, C. & Glenn, R.W. “Enlisting Madison Avenue: The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation” , (2007), p.17

[4] US DoD, “Task Force on Strategic Communication: Report of the Defense Science Board”, (2008), p. xi-xii

[5] Cull, N.,  Public Diplomacy: Seven Lessons for its Future from its Past in “Engagement: Public Diplomacy in a Globalised World”, (2008), p. 25

[6] Ibid (2008), p. 20

Nostalgia – Perception of the European Union as a Global Actor

No, not many other people know who she is either ... yet

As the Lisbon Treaty comes into force, a little reflection into the perception of the European Union as a global power as seen almost five years ago (2005).  A bit of nostalgia but may be an appropriate starting point to assessing where the EU is now, and where it might be going.

INTRODUCTION

That the European Union (EU), being the world’s largest economic entity, has influence in today’s world is generally without doubt, but to be a true global actor requires influence across a wide spectrum.  In defining it as a global actor, one should consider seven, often interdependent, aspects to be fundamental in affording the EU any global influence.  These are: economics; international or regional cooperation; promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance[1]; prevention of violent conflict; fight against international crime and terrorism; and military capability.   Each should be examined so as to assess how far the EU can currently be considered a global actor. However, regardless of the EU’s potential capacity in these areas, economic, political and military weight count for little on the world stage without the political will to engage that weight and the capacity for, and autonomy of, decision-making[2].

ECONOMICS

With an annual GDP of almost 11 trillion euros, accounting for, on average, some 25% of world GDP, contained within a unique and successful customs union, in economic terms the EU can be seen as a superpower, with undoubted global influence.  Via the customs union it has largely pooled the economic trading capacity of its member states, such that it is the world’s leading exporter of goods, services and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and the main export market for some 130 countries around the globe[3].  Through the European Community pillar, it possesses its most powerful foreign policy instruments: the capacity to enter into trade, economic cooperation and development agreements with other economic entities, national or regional, especially through the European Community’s General System of Preferences (GSP); and direct financial assistance to third countries[4].  Its very success in regional economic integration is held up as an example across the world, allowing for some degree of influence globally.  Its sheer trading power, economic capacity and prominence make it easy to regard as a global actor in economic terms.

With its significant economic power, it has considerable influence with the global institutions (International Financial Institutions – IFIs) which influence global trade and finance regulations, such as the World Trade organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  This is regardless of the lack of an EU seat, but due to the fact that cohesion and concensus is relatively strong over trade issues[5].  Yet, there are brakes upon the already significant EU influence, but these are less a fault of the EU than the rigid and hierarchical structures of such bodies[6].  Further, the EU is often seen as falling foul of WTO rules, being a respondent in disputes almost as often as a complainant, but this does not diminish the EU’s global influence and possibly proves its existence[7].  Regardless, technically proficient in economic management and with competent control mechanisms, expressed exclusively through the Commission, the economic weight of the EU is by far its biggest ‘stick’ and ‘carrot’, available for exercise outside the strictly economic sphere.

REGIONAL COOPERATION

Closely aligned to economics, in regards to international, or more specific to the EU, regional cooperation, the EU is most exemplary, largely through its own identity and origins.  Relying on legal frameworks and diplomacy, it rather uniquely fosters regional cooperation within its own neighborhood and further afield, to a degree that few can match[8].  With cooperation agreements between the EU and Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Andean Community, African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP)[9], the Central American Community, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Mercosur, there is now also a plethora of regular high level political meetings between representatives of the EU and other regional groups across the globe.  In this, the EU has considerable international profile and a modicum of global influence.

However, whilst the will is there, there is a growing ‘capabilities-expectations’ gap, in which EU institutions are finding it difficult to address all groupings, ‘to the detriment of Europe’s international profile’[10].  Further, this ‘new regionalization’, although largely driven by the EU[11], is only incumbent upon the trend of globalization which is by no means irreversible.

HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

The promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance is seen as a significant

Talking of good governance ...

element of the EU’s international image, although rather more reactive than proactive[12].  However, detailed analysis reveals limits.  Having looked at these issues relatively late on, other European organizations stole a march on the EU and feature heavily in promoting common European standards.  The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is a creation of the Council of Europe, to which the individual EU member states have signed up.  The Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) also plays a significant part the promotion of democracy. Although the ideals of the ECHR have been incorporated into EU charters and conventions, they tend to be non-binding and have little legal basis, providing limited legitimacy when it comes to addressing the issue on a global stage.  Similarly, with the EU being accused itself of a ‘democratic deficit’, legitimacy here is also sketchy and good governance is difficult to codify anyway.

Although other organizations crowd into this field, the EU does possess powers unavailable to them through its economic and political weight.  The use of conditionality, the provision of aid (via the EU’s European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)) and diplomatic instruments are the EU’s strong hand.  However, conditionality can be difficult due to existing member state, especially ex-colonial, bilateral ties, EIDHR’s budget is paltry and security concerns over hasty democratization bringing civil strife mean that EU policy in this area is fairly inconsistent and decision-making is hampered.

Yet, there is a collective will, based upon largely shared history, development of common values and a perception of insecurity in not doing so, within the EU member states to promote human rights, democracy and good governance.  If the practicalities prove difficult there is a global platform which proves more amenable to the EU itself: the United Nations.  Despite recent rifts over Iraq, there is increasing convergence of EU member state voting in the UN General Assembly, approaching some 85%, making it an effective machine within the UN[13].   Despite it being accused of being mostly reactive, the EU has been seen to be a powerful UN actor when cohesive and committed, such as over the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court (ICC)[14].

CONFLICT PREVENTION

The EU itself can be seen from its inception as a mechanism designed to prevent conflict in Europe and the concept is now enshrined within the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).  Outside its own borders, the EU has become increasingly involved as a mediating element in conflicts within its neighborhood, such as the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and in FYROM, with varying success, and the Mediterranean. Increasingly, the EU features as a party, within a larger grouping, normally including the US, to conflict resolution and/or prevention, such as efforts in the Middle East[15].  However, US interests cause EU influence to wane over distance, inherently displaying the EU’s limited global scope.  Aside the Middle East and Central Asia, Africa does appear to be progressively showing on the EU’s radar, with growing commitment, although far short of direct intervention, being promised from the Council[16].  The EU’s provisions for conflict prevention have improved considerably, with the Goteberg European Council of June 2001 sparking a drive towards coherent policy in this area.

Yet, despite impressive improvements and significant will, the EU’s conflict prevention capacity is diplomatically weak.  Despite the political influence afforded by the EU’s economic standing, conditionality and sanctions often fail in poverty stricken and violence ridden areas and limits have been apparent with more developed states, such as between India and Pakistan in May 2002.  The Iraq crisis presented the epitome of a lack of vigourous and clear diplomatic signals from the EU; signals most necessary in conflict management.  Yet, some see the EU’s ‘soft’ power, without the threat of military force, as its unique strength in conflict prevention[17].

TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL CRIME

Although international terrorism is nothing new to the EU region, the full impact of international organized crime was only fully realized as the Cold War ended, allowing infiltration of crime syndicates from the former Soviet Bloc.  Thus, whilst national policies developed, the EU has had a late start in this field. Through the provisions of EUROPOL, the Schengen Agreement, European Judicial Cooperation Unit (EUROJUST) and other capabilities within the third pillar, Justice and Home affairs (JHA), the EU’s capacity in fighting international crime and terrorism, within its own borders, has been improved, especially since the events of 11 September, 2001[18].  In November 2002 EUROPOL’s competences were expanded: it is now authorized to participate with member states in joint investigation teams and request member states to initiate investigations. In February 2002, EUROJUST was established to coordinate cooperation between prosecution authorities in EU member states.  These are largely of an internal dimension but provide for some high levels of coordination, which have eased cooperation with other national governments and crime-fighting authorities.  In December 2001, the EU’s impact upon global crime and terrorism issues expanded through the signing of cooperation agreement with the US, demonstrating a new emphasis on its external crime-fighting remit, which extend to judicial cooperation, immigration and asylum[19].

The diplomatic instruments of dialogue and conditionality, such as use of GSP, are also major features of the EU’s commitment in tackling these issues.  However, JHA is largely internal and effectively tackling international organized crime and terrorism requires the evolution of significant cross pillar coordination, which is proving slow.  As a global player in this field, the EU has still further steps to make.

MILITARY POWER

Nice ... but not NATO

The legacy of the Cold war, in which Western European states, EU or not, relied upon NATO, remains problematical for the EU in terms of developing its own globally capable military capabilities.  The EU lacks deployable forces for expeditionary warfare, that is, forces for worldwide combat missions. The member states of the European Union have approximately 1.7 million men and women under arms but are capable of deploying only approximately 10 percent of these forces for missions abroad, largely through a lack of strategic resources, such as airlift capacity[20].  The’ headline goals’ of the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) and development of the more realistic battlegroup concept show commitment to the idea of EU military capability but compared to a truly global military machine, the US, the effort is rather small scale and the will to follow this path is confused by the NATO aspect.  Hence the view that the EU is still a military midget with grand aspirations.

However, many of the armed forces of the EU member states, are relatively capable in terms of the missions required of a global actor, ideally suited to and with considerable experience in peacekeeping and policing missions.  As such, EU missions to the Democratic Republic of Congo (Artemis) and Macedonia (Concordia) have demonstrated this limited but competent global capability.   Whereas the RRF may find itself vying with the embryonic NATO Response Force (NRF), the Battlegroup concept, allowing the EU much more flexibility, realistic force generation options and simpler command and control issues, from political to tactical, may allow for a truly global military capacity, worthy of a global ‘soft’ power.  Ironically, some see this ‘militarization’ of the EU as a direct threat to its agency as a ‘soft’ power and to its identity, if fragile, as a ‘civilian power’ based upon liberal humanitarian principles[21].

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Endorsing a policy of ‘effective multilateralism’, the EU’s ethos is well suited towards the ideals of global governance.  As previously mentioned, the EU does have influence within various global institutions such as the WTO.  Within the UN, where broad EU member state concensus exists, which, although overshadowed by high profile rifts, is common, considerable pressure can be brought to bare, especially when a powerful, if temporary, EU ‘caucus’ exists within the Security Council[22].  In the fast-growing relationship between the EU and the UN, to the extent that the multilateral UN is shifting towards a ‘soft’ power approach to global issues, the EU is seen as a major contributor to the agenda[23]. Now, as the combined contributions of the EU and its member states make the EU the largest contributor to UN programmes, the authority and recognition of the EU as a major global actor within the UN is widely recognized[24].

CONCLUSION

The EU is not a traditional global actor in realist terms, which the US epitomises, but in a relatively short time span it has developed significantly its international reach and as a ‘soft’ civilian power it has considerable global weight, across a wide spectrum[25].  Much of its weight rests upon its massive economic consequence in world terms, which is a mighty instrument capable of use outside the economic sphere.    Such use is dependent upon the cohesion of perspective of its member states but with such a concrete economic basis, it is developing politically as a global player, even though it is hampered a hazy sense of identity and interests and by the weakness of its foreign policy institutions and decision-making processes.  Despite this, although recent years have seen fragmentation, a general will to maintain cohesive foreign policy, supporting its global influence, is being maintained[26].  Many have played down the EU’s global influence, yet its development as a global player does continue, although often at a glacial rate.  Even so, the EU’s global influence across the spectrum is currently patchy, partly due to its own priorities, inherent capabilities, member state inconsistencies and external agency.  Further, its autonomy in exerting influence remains indeterminate.  In allowing the EU to exert some wide authority, some parts of the globe and some global issues are much more difficult than others.  These areas and issues are defined by the global actor: the United States.

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[1] Within which are included environmental issues.

 

[2] Coolsaet and Biscop, (2004), p. 7.

[3] ‘Making globalisation work for everyone: The European Union and world trade’, European Commission Information Brochure, December 2002.

[4] Smith (2003), p. 53.

[5] This is relative, as there remain several disagreements, not least over agricultural products.

[6] ‘Critics claim structures are rigid, outdated and overly hierarchical and that working practices lack transparency and openness to input from non-governmental players.Pascal Lamy, after Seattle, described the WTO as “medieval” while Franz Fischler, after Cancun, stated that there needed to be an overhaul of WTO structures.’ Cameron (2003), p. 13.

[7] Alasdair R. Young in ‘The EU and World Trade: Doha and Beyond’, Cowles & Dinan (2004), pp. 213-5.

[8] Smith (2003), p. 95.

[9] Linked together via the 2000 Cotonou Agreement, replacing the Lome agreement of 1975. Nugent (2003), pp.433-4.

[10] Regelsberger, cited in Smith (2003), p. 91.

[11] Gilpin (2001), p. 341.

[12] Smith (2003), p. 121 & 144.

[13] Johansson-Nogues, ‘The Fifteen and the Accession States in the United Nations General Assembly,  CFSP Forum, Vol 2 Issue 1, January 2004, p. 10.

[14] Cameron (2003), p. 15.

[15] Anand Menon in ‘Foreign and Security Policies of the EU’, Cowles & Dinan(2004), pp. 231-2.

[16] Smith (2003), p.151.

[17] Smith (2003), p.170

[18] Smith (2003), p.175

[19]John D. Occhipinti in’Police and Judicial Co-operation’, Cowles & Dinan (2004), pp. 192-3.

[20] de Wijk, ‘European Military Reform for a Global Partnership’, The Washington Quarterly,  Winter 2003-04, pp. 197–210.

[21] Peterson & Sjursen (1998), p. 179.

[22] Dedring, Reflections on the coordination of the EU member states in organs of the United Nations’, CFSP Forum, Vol 2 Issue 1, January 2004, p. 3.

[23] Graham, (2004), pp. 14-15.

[24] Laatikainen, ‘Assessing the EU as an Actor at the UN: Authority, Cohesion, Recognition and Autonomy’, CFSP Forum Vol 2 Issue 1, January 2004, p. 4.

[25] Peterson & Sjursen (1998), p. 184.

[26] Hill, ‘Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy Since 11 September 2001’, Journal of Common Market Studies Volume 42, Number 1,  March 2004, pp. 160-62.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cameron, Fraser. The European Union and Global Governance European Policy Paper No 7, November 2003.  Available at http://www.epc.orgp.

Coolsaet, Rik and Biscop, Sven.  A European Security Concept for the 21^st Century, Egmont Paper 1 Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIIB) Brussels, April 2004.  Available at http://www.irri-kiib.bep.

Cowles, Maria Green and Dinan, Desmond,  Developments in the European Union 2  Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

Dedring, Juergen.  ‘Reflections on the Coordination of the EU Member States in Organs of the United Nations’, CFSP Forum, Vol 2 Issue 1, January 2004.

de Wijk, Rob. ‘European Military Reform for a Global Partnership’ The Washington Quarterly  Winter 2003-04.

Gilpin, Robert.  Global Politcal Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.

Graham, Kennedy. Towards Effective Multilateralism – The EU and the UN: Partners in Crisis Management European Policy Paper No 13, November 2004.  Available at ^http://www.epc.orgp.

Hill, Christopher.  ‘Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy Since 11 September 2001’, Journal of Common Market Studies Volume 42, Number 1. March 2004.

Johansson-Nogues, Elisabeth. ‘The Fifteen and the Accession States in the United Nations General Assembly,  CFSP Forum, Vol 2 Issue 1 January 2004.

Keens-Soper, Maurice.  Europe in the World: The Persistence of Power Politics  Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999.

Laaitkainen, Katie Verlin. ‘Assessing the EU as an Actor at the UN: Authority, Cohesion, Recognition and Autonomy’, CFSP Forum, Vol 2 Issue 1, January 2004

Nugent, Neill.  The Government and Politics of the European Union (Fifth Edition) Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

Peterson, Jogn and Sjursen, Helene.  A Common Foreign Policy for Europe: Competing Visions of the CFSP  London: Routledge, 1998.

Smith, Karen E. European Foreign Policy in a Changing World  Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003.

‘Making globalisation work for everyone: The European Union and world trade’ European Commission Information Brochure, December 2002.

Who should the Coalition try to impress?

See below some wise words from Major Mehar Omar Khan (Pakistan Army) from his article “Afghanistan: Seven Fundamental Questions” found at Small Wars Journal (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/319-khan.pdf)

Who should the coalition try to impress: Afghans or rest of the world?

While the pressure to present tangible results in terms that sound familiar to domestic and global audience is understandable, lives of young men should not be ‘wasted’ in pursuit of hollow ideals and empty slogans that mean woefully little to the people of Afghanistan. While there is essentially nothing bad about transparent ballot boxes, soap opera television, Afghan movies and a few dozen bold and beautiful women in the legislative assembly, the Afghan people look wearily at all these things. They are not impressed with these ‘achievements’, not just because they have an outdated mindset, but because it means so little to them in terms of alleviating some of their most basic concerns like hunger, malnutrition, disease, violence and fear. Coalition soldiers should not have to die for anything less noble than helping the people of Afghanistan forge a new future and a new destiny for themselves – a destiny that they will themselves determine in ways that they feel comfortable with.

Here are some ideas.

One, please understand the hearts and minds that you are trying to win. Most of these minds are illiterate, unschooled and locked in the last century. Most of these hearts are raw, romantic, sentimental and pure as a pearl. Help them start where they actually are and not where you want them to be. At their present level of socio-economic development, Afghans do not truly need a majestic parliament building, a palatial house for the president, five star hotels and nicely suited dummies as rulers in Kabul and Kandahar. They need small schools, clean drinking water, some pills for that headache which refuses to go away, some money to buy food for their kids and some assistance to kick-start their farming or that little shop in a mud-hut. People want their liberators to know that they need ‘electricity before they are asked to destroy their kerosene lantern’ and that they need to at least be able to read names before they are asked to choose one out of a long list of people vying to be their President.

Playing to this crowd ...

Two, coalition must refuse to lock itself in a fight that tramples the people. This will involve some sacrifice in the short term but huge dividends in the long term.

Three, people need soldiers that respect their values and their traditions because, however outdated they may be, these are their values and their traditions. This land belongs to a ‘people’; it’s not the property of ‘a state’. In this context, is it not fair to ask how much of an effort, in terms of resources, has gone to ‘Afghanistan the state’ and how much to ‘Afghanistan the people’? How much of the money and resources and security has stayed and stagnated in Kabul guarding criminals and drug-lords; and how much of it has actually reached a far flung Helmand village caught in the center of the storm? How much of attention has gone to people most bitter about being ousted from power (Pashtuns) and how much of it has been lavished on communities that have generally always enjoyed a relative peace? Asking the right questions is the true test of honesty. Giving the right answers is a test of leadership. Questions carry their own correct answers as well as consequences for wrong answers.

... or this one?