Nostalgia – Perception of the European Union as a Global Actor

No, not many other people know who she is either ... yet

As the Lisbon Treaty comes into force, a little reflection into the perception of the European Union as a global power as seen almost five years ago (2005).  A bit of nostalgia but may be an appropriate starting point to assessing where the EU is now, and where it might be going.

INTRODUCTION

That the European Union (EU), being the world’s largest economic entity, has influence in today’s world is generally without doubt, but to be a true global actor requires influence across a wide spectrum.  In defining it as a global actor, one should consider seven, often interdependent, aspects to be fundamental in affording the EU any global influence.  These are: economics; international or regional cooperation; promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance[1]; prevention of violent conflict; fight against international crime and terrorism; and military capability.   Each should be examined so as to assess how far the EU can currently be considered a global actor. However, regardless of the EU’s potential capacity in these areas, economic, political and military weight count for little on the world stage without the political will to engage that weight and the capacity for, and autonomy of, decision-making[2].

ECONOMICS

With an annual GDP of almost 11 trillion euros, accounting for, on average, some 25% of world GDP, contained within a unique and successful customs union, in economic terms the EU can be seen as a superpower, with undoubted global influence.  Via the customs union it has largely pooled the economic trading capacity of its member states, such that it is the world’s leading exporter of goods, services and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and the main export market for some 130 countries around the globe[3].  Through the European Community pillar, it possesses its most powerful foreign policy instruments: the capacity to enter into trade, economic cooperation and development agreements with other economic entities, national or regional, especially through the European Community’s General System of Preferences (GSP); and direct financial assistance to third countries[4].  Its very success in regional economic integration is held up as an example across the world, allowing for some degree of influence globally.  Its sheer trading power, economic capacity and prominence make it easy to regard as a global actor in economic terms.

With its significant economic power, it has considerable influence with the global institutions (International Financial Institutions – IFIs) which influence global trade and finance regulations, such as the World Trade organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  This is regardless of the lack of an EU seat, but due to the fact that cohesion and concensus is relatively strong over trade issues[5].  Yet, there are brakes upon the already significant EU influence, but these are less a fault of the EU than the rigid and hierarchical structures of such bodies[6].  Further, the EU is often seen as falling foul of WTO rules, being a respondent in disputes almost as often as a complainant, but this does not diminish the EU’s global influence and possibly proves its existence[7].  Regardless, technically proficient in economic management and with competent control mechanisms, expressed exclusively through the Commission, the economic weight of the EU is by far its biggest ‘stick’ and ‘carrot’, available for exercise outside the strictly economic sphere.

REGIONAL COOPERATION

Closely aligned to economics, in regards to international, or more specific to the EU, regional cooperation, the EU is most exemplary, largely through its own identity and origins.  Relying on legal frameworks and diplomacy, it rather uniquely fosters regional cooperation within its own neighborhood and further afield, to a degree that few can match[8].  With cooperation agreements between the EU and Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Andean Community, African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP)[9], the Central American Community, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Mercosur, there is now also a plethora of regular high level political meetings between representatives of the EU and other regional groups across the globe.  In this, the EU has considerable international profile and a modicum of global influence.

However, whilst the will is there, there is a growing ‘capabilities-expectations’ gap, in which EU institutions are finding it difficult to address all groupings, ‘to the detriment of Europe’s international profile’[10].  Further, this ‘new regionalization’, although largely driven by the EU[11], is only incumbent upon the trend of globalization which is by no means irreversible.

HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

The promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance is seen as a significant

Talking of good governance ...

element of the EU’s international image, although rather more reactive than proactive[12].  However, detailed analysis reveals limits.  Having looked at these issues relatively late on, other European organizations stole a march on the EU and feature heavily in promoting common European standards.  The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is a creation of the Council of Europe, to which the individual EU member states have signed up.  The Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) also plays a significant part the promotion of democracy. Although the ideals of the ECHR have been incorporated into EU charters and conventions, they tend to be non-binding and have little legal basis, providing limited legitimacy when it comes to addressing the issue on a global stage.  Similarly, with the EU being accused itself of a ‘democratic deficit’, legitimacy here is also sketchy and good governance is difficult to codify anyway.

Although other organizations crowd into this field, the EU does possess powers unavailable to them through its economic and political weight.  The use of conditionality, the provision of aid (via the EU’s European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)) and diplomatic instruments are the EU’s strong hand.  However, conditionality can be difficult due to existing member state, especially ex-colonial, bilateral ties, EIDHR’s budget is paltry and security concerns over hasty democratization bringing civil strife mean that EU policy in this area is fairly inconsistent and decision-making is hampered.

Yet, there is a collective will, based upon largely shared history, development of common values and a perception of insecurity in not doing so, within the EU member states to promote human rights, democracy and good governance.  If the practicalities prove difficult there is a global platform which proves more amenable to the EU itself: the United Nations.  Despite recent rifts over Iraq, there is increasing convergence of EU member state voting in the UN General Assembly, approaching some 85%, making it an effective machine within the UN[13].   Despite it being accused of being mostly reactive, the EU has been seen to be a powerful UN actor when cohesive and committed, such as over the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court (ICC)[14].

CONFLICT PREVENTION

The EU itself can be seen from its inception as a mechanism designed to prevent conflict in Europe and the concept is now enshrined within the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).  Outside its own borders, the EU has become increasingly involved as a mediating element in conflicts within its neighborhood, such as the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and in FYROM, with varying success, and the Mediterranean. Increasingly, the EU features as a party, within a larger grouping, normally including the US, to conflict resolution and/or prevention, such as efforts in the Middle East[15].  However, US interests cause EU influence to wane over distance, inherently displaying the EU’s limited global scope.  Aside the Middle East and Central Asia, Africa does appear to be progressively showing on the EU’s radar, with growing commitment, although far short of direct intervention, being promised from the Council[16].  The EU’s provisions for conflict prevention have improved considerably, with the Goteberg European Council of June 2001 sparking a drive towards coherent policy in this area.

Yet, despite impressive improvements and significant will, the EU’s conflict prevention capacity is diplomatically weak.  Despite the political influence afforded by the EU’s economic standing, conditionality and sanctions often fail in poverty stricken and violence ridden areas and limits have been apparent with more developed states, such as between India and Pakistan in May 2002.  The Iraq crisis presented the epitome of a lack of vigourous and clear diplomatic signals from the EU; signals most necessary in conflict management.  Yet, some see the EU’s ‘soft’ power, without the threat of military force, as its unique strength in conflict prevention[17].

TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL CRIME

Although international terrorism is nothing new to the EU region, the full impact of international organized crime was only fully realized as the Cold War ended, allowing infiltration of crime syndicates from the former Soviet Bloc.  Thus, whilst national policies developed, the EU has had a late start in this field. Through the provisions of EUROPOL, the Schengen Agreement, European Judicial Cooperation Unit (EUROJUST) and other capabilities within the third pillar, Justice and Home affairs (JHA), the EU’s capacity in fighting international crime and terrorism, within its own borders, has been improved, especially since the events of 11 September, 2001[18].  In November 2002 EUROPOL’s competences were expanded: it is now authorized to participate with member states in joint investigation teams and request member states to initiate investigations. In February 2002, EUROJUST was established to coordinate cooperation between prosecution authorities in EU member states.  These are largely of an internal dimension but provide for some high levels of coordination, which have eased cooperation with other national governments and crime-fighting authorities.  In December 2001, the EU’s impact upon global crime and terrorism issues expanded through the signing of cooperation agreement with the US, demonstrating a new emphasis on its external crime-fighting remit, which extend to judicial cooperation, immigration and asylum[19].

The diplomatic instruments of dialogue and conditionality, such as use of GSP, are also major features of the EU’s commitment in tackling these issues.  However, JHA is largely internal and effectively tackling international organized crime and terrorism requires the evolution of significant cross pillar coordination, which is proving slow.  As a global player in this field, the EU has still further steps to make.

MILITARY POWER

Nice ... but not NATO

The legacy of the Cold war, in which Western European states, EU or not, relied upon NATO, remains problematical for the EU in terms of developing its own globally capable military capabilities.  The EU lacks deployable forces for expeditionary warfare, that is, forces for worldwide combat missions. The member states of the European Union have approximately 1.7 million men and women under arms but are capable of deploying only approximately 10 percent of these forces for missions abroad, largely through a lack of strategic resources, such as airlift capacity[20].  The’ headline goals’ of the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) and development of the more realistic battlegroup concept show commitment to the idea of EU military capability but compared to a truly global military machine, the US, the effort is rather small scale and the will to follow this path is confused by the NATO aspect.  Hence the view that the EU is still a military midget with grand aspirations.

However, many of the armed forces of the EU member states, are relatively capable in terms of the missions required of a global actor, ideally suited to and with considerable experience in peacekeeping and policing missions.  As such, EU missions to the Democratic Republic of Congo (Artemis) and Macedonia (Concordia) have demonstrated this limited but competent global capability.   Whereas the RRF may find itself vying with the embryonic NATO Response Force (NRF), the Battlegroup concept, allowing the EU much more flexibility, realistic force generation options and simpler command and control issues, from political to tactical, may allow for a truly global military capacity, worthy of a global ‘soft’ power.  Ironically, some see this ‘militarization’ of the EU as a direct threat to its agency as a ‘soft’ power and to its identity, if fragile, as a ‘civilian power’ based upon liberal humanitarian principles[21].

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Endorsing a policy of ‘effective multilateralism’, the EU’s ethos is well suited towards the ideals of global governance.  As previously mentioned, the EU does have influence within various global institutions such as the WTO.  Within the UN, where broad EU member state concensus exists, which, although overshadowed by high profile rifts, is common, considerable pressure can be brought to bare, especially when a powerful, if temporary, EU ‘caucus’ exists within the Security Council[22].  In the fast-growing relationship between the EU and the UN, to the extent that the multilateral UN is shifting towards a ‘soft’ power approach to global issues, the EU is seen as a major contributor to the agenda[23]. Now, as the combined contributions of the EU and its member states make the EU the largest contributor to UN programmes, the authority and recognition of the EU as a major global actor within the UN is widely recognized[24].

CONCLUSION

The EU is not a traditional global actor in realist terms, which the US epitomises, but in a relatively short time span it has developed significantly its international reach and as a ‘soft’ civilian power it has considerable global weight, across a wide spectrum[25].  Much of its weight rests upon its massive economic consequence in world terms, which is a mighty instrument capable of use outside the economic sphere.    Such use is dependent upon the cohesion of perspective of its member states but with such a concrete economic basis, it is developing politically as a global player, even though it is hampered a hazy sense of identity and interests and by the weakness of its foreign policy institutions and decision-making processes.  Despite this, although recent years have seen fragmentation, a general will to maintain cohesive foreign policy, supporting its global influence, is being maintained[26].  Many have played down the EU’s global influence, yet its development as a global player does continue, although often at a glacial rate.  Even so, the EU’s global influence across the spectrum is currently patchy, partly due to its own priorities, inherent capabilities, member state inconsistencies and external agency.  Further, its autonomy in exerting influence remains indeterminate.  In allowing the EU to exert some wide authority, some parts of the globe and some global issues are much more difficult than others.  These areas and issues are defined by the global actor: the United States.

---

[1] Within which are included environmental issues.

 

[2] Coolsaet and Biscop, (2004), p. 7.

[3] ‘Making globalisation work for everyone: The European Union and world trade’, European Commission Information Brochure, December 2002.

[4] Smith (2003), p. 53.

[5] This is relative, as there remain several disagreements, not least over agricultural products.

[6] ‘Critics claim structures are rigid, outdated and overly hierarchical and that working practices lack transparency and openness to input from non-governmental players.Pascal Lamy, after Seattle, described the WTO as “medieval” while Franz Fischler, after Cancun, stated that there needed to be an overhaul of WTO structures.’ Cameron (2003), p. 13.

[7] Alasdair R. Young in ‘The EU and World Trade: Doha and Beyond’, Cowles & Dinan (2004), pp. 213-5.

[8] Smith (2003), p. 95.

[9] Linked together via the 2000 Cotonou Agreement, replacing the Lome agreement of 1975. Nugent (2003), pp.433-4.

[10] Regelsberger, cited in Smith (2003), p. 91.

[11] Gilpin (2001), p. 341.

[12] Smith (2003), p. 121 & 144.

[13] Johansson-Nogues, ‘The Fifteen and the Accession States in the United Nations General Assembly,  CFSP Forum, Vol 2 Issue 1, January 2004, p. 10.

[14] Cameron (2003), p. 15.

[15] Anand Menon in ‘Foreign and Security Policies of the EU’, Cowles & Dinan(2004), pp. 231-2.

[16] Smith (2003), p.151.

[17] Smith (2003), p.170

[18] Smith (2003), p.175

[19]John D. Occhipinti in’Police and Judicial Co-operation’, Cowles & Dinan (2004), pp. 192-3.

[20] de Wijk, ‘European Military Reform for a Global Partnership’, The Washington Quarterly,  Winter 2003-04, pp. 197–210.

[21] Peterson & Sjursen (1998), p. 179.

[22] Dedring, Reflections on the coordination of the EU member states in organs of the United Nations’, CFSP Forum, Vol 2 Issue 1, January 2004, p. 3.

[23] Graham, (2004), pp. 14-15.

[24] Laatikainen, ‘Assessing the EU as an Actor at the UN: Authority, Cohesion, Recognition and Autonomy’, CFSP Forum Vol 2 Issue 1, January 2004, p. 4.

[25] Peterson & Sjursen (1998), p. 184.

[26] Hill, ‘Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy Since 11 September 2001’, Journal of Common Market Studies Volume 42, Number 1,  March 2004, pp. 160-62.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cameron, Fraser. The European Union and Global Governance European Policy Paper No 7, November 2003.  Available at http://www.epc.orgp.

Coolsaet, Rik and Biscop, Sven.  A European Security Concept for the 21^st Century, Egmont Paper 1 Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIIB) Brussels, April 2004.  Available at http://www.irri-kiib.bep.

Cowles, Maria Green and Dinan, Desmond,  Developments in the European Union 2  Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

Dedring, Juergen.  ‘Reflections on the Coordination of the EU Member States in Organs of the United Nations’, CFSP Forum, Vol 2 Issue 1, January 2004.

de Wijk, Rob. ‘European Military Reform for a Global Partnership’ The Washington Quarterly  Winter 2003-04.

Gilpin, Robert.  Global Politcal Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.

Graham, Kennedy. Towards Effective Multilateralism – The EU and the UN: Partners in Crisis Management European Policy Paper No 13, November 2004.  Available at ^http://www.epc.orgp.

Hill, Christopher.  ‘Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy Since 11 September 2001’, Journal of Common Market Studies Volume 42, Number 1. March 2004.

Johansson-Nogues, Elisabeth. ‘The Fifteen and the Accession States in the United Nations General Assembly,  CFSP Forum, Vol 2 Issue 1 January 2004.

Keens-Soper, Maurice.  Europe in the World: The Persistence of Power Politics  Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999.

Laaitkainen, Katie Verlin. ‘Assessing the EU as an Actor at the UN: Authority, Cohesion, Recognition and Autonomy’, CFSP Forum, Vol 2 Issue 1, January 2004

Nugent, Neill.  The Government and Politics of the European Union (Fifth Edition) Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

Peterson, Jogn and Sjursen, Helene.  A Common Foreign Policy for Europe: Competing Visions of the CFSP  London: Routledge, 1998.

Smith, Karen E. European Foreign Policy in a Changing World  Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003.

‘Making globalisation work for everyone: The European Union and world trade’ European Commission Information Brochure, December 2002.

Who should the Coalition try to impress?

See below some wise words from Major Mehar Omar Khan (Pakistan Army) from his article “Afghanistan: Seven Fundamental Questions” found at Small Wars Journal (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/319-khan.pdf)

Who should the coalition try to impress: Afghans or rest of the world?

While the pressure to present tangible results in terms that sound familiar to domestic and global audience is understandable, lives of young men should not be ‘wasted’ in pursuit of hollow ideals and empty slogans that mean woefully little to the people of Afghanistan. While there is essentially nothing bad about transparent ballot boxes, soap opera television, Afghan movies and a few dozen bold and beautiful women in the legislative assembly, the Afghan people look wearily at all these things. They are not impressed with these ‘achievements’, not just because they have an outdated mindset, but because it means so little to them in terms of alleviating some of their most basic concerns like hunger, malnutrition, disease, violence and fear. Coalition soldiers should not have to die for anything less noble than helping the people of Afghanistan forge a new future and a new destiny for themselves – a destiny that they will themselves determine in ways that they feel comfortable with.

Here are some ideas.

One, please understand the hearts and minds that you are trying to win. Most of these minds are illiterate, unschooled and locked in the last century. Most of these hearts are raw, romantic, sentimental and pure as a pearl. Help them start where they actually are and not where you want them to be. At their present level of socio-economic development, Afghans do not truly need a majestic parliament building, a palatial house for the president, five star hotels and nicely suited dummies as rulers in Kabul and Kandahar. They need small schools, clean drinking water, some pills for that headache which refuses to go away, some money to buy food for their kids and some assistance to kick-start their farming or that little shop in a mud-hut. People want their liberators to know that they need ‘electricity before they are asked to destroy their kerosene lantern’ and that they need to at least be able to read names before they are asked to choose one out of a long list of people vying to be their President.

Playing to this crowd ...

Two, coalition must refuse to lock itself in a fight that tramples the people. This will involve some sacrifice in the short term but huge dividends in the long term.

Three, people need soldiers that respect their values and their traditions because, however outdated they may be, these are their values and their traditions. This land belongs to a ‘people’; it’s not the property of ‘a state’. In this context, is it not fair to ask how much of an effort, in terms of resources, has gone to ‘Afghanistan the state’ and how much to ‘Afghanistan the people’? How much of the money and resources and security has stayed and stagnated in Kabul guarding criminals and drug-lords; and how much of it has actually reached a far flung Helmand village caught in the center of the storm? How much of attention has gone to people most bitter about being ousted from power (Pashtuns) and how much of it has been lavished on communities that have generally always enjoyed a relative peace? Asking the right questions is the true test of honesty. Giving the right answers is a test of leadership. Questions carry their own correct answers as well as consequences for wrong answers.

... or this one?

Afghanistan Matters – A little story of hope

Poignant video, winner of Afghanistan Matters video contest – appears a little military to start but moves on to the human aspect.

 

What lies Beneath

The bloody summer in Afghanistan and elections in Iran have recently brought communications within the foreign policy arena back into the spotlight, showing public relations and strategic communication to be close,if sometimes misunderstood, relatives.

Establishing a radio station to persuade locals not to support pirates; justifying heavy combat operations while trying to convince homeless villagers to support your side; convincing an enemy that his cause is doomed; maintaining domestic public support for an unpopular and difficult foreign policy; encouraging populations to embrace ideas conflicting with their traditional culture; supporting repressed publics in their pursuit of freedom.

These are examples of a field of communications which rarely grace the pages of PR and communications magazines, but which feature heavily in the daily news intake of big and disparate publics, and have the potential to influence the very future of global geopolitics.

This field of foreign policy communication is known within the practising community as ’strategic communication’.

Outside the field there are terms well recognised by PR practitioners, even laymen – propaganda, nation-branding, psychological operations – terms that give a taster, but rarely provide the full flavour, of a complex communication arena. Likewise, there are fragments which can cumulatively paint the environment of strategic communication – the child soldier laden with ammunition and an AK47; sparkling white United Nation aid convoys trailing through arid, burnt scrubland; a battered but prized radio spouting the scratchy tones of the BBC World Service. These images might evoke emotive responses but they do little to explain strategic communication.

The precise definition of strategic communication is debatable, but put simply, it is the use of communication, in all its guises, to support and achieve foreign policy objectives.

Due to the variety of subject areas, from climate change to assuaging warring factions’, the variety of factors – including Non Governmental Organisations, states, terrorist groups, diasporas and global institutions; and the variety of publics, from the hi-tech media savvy Iranian teenager to the illiterate Sudanese goatherd, the field, operating globally by definition, rightly deserves the label ’strategic’. To unravel the concept, it’s worthwhile examining a simple but effective model, breaking it into four constituent pillars, some of which PR practitioners will be very familiar with.

From the media-savvy Iranian teenager ...

First pillar: Public diplomacy

Firstly, public diplomacy seeks, through the exchange of people and ideas, to build lasting relationships and understanding of a nation’s culture, values and policies.

A term coined in the 1960s, public diplomacy gained recognition as a tool of foreign policy during the Cold War. After a hiatus during the 1990s, the aftermath of 9/11 has brought the practice back to the fore in many foreign policy establishments, making it a hot topic, including in United States diplomatic circles.

Second pillar: International broadcasting services

In close alignment with public diplomacy, the second pillar comprises international broadcasting services – BBC World, Voice of America, China’s CCTV-9 and France 24 to name a few. These governmentfunded services transmit news, information, public affairs programs and entertainment to global audiences in a variety of ways.

The influence of such services is often misjudged as being little more than of fleeting interest to bored businessmen in international hotels. But they can also be very powerful, especially if the significant penetration of BBC Pashto in Afghanistan is anything to go by.

Third pillar: Media relations

Media relations or operations are used by Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence to depict communication activities intended primarily to inform and influence domestic media and, therefore, home audiences.

... to the illiterate Sudanese goatherd.

In today’s information environment, this is a quaint idea, given that there is almost complete convergence between media available to domestic and foreign audiences.

Such convergence provides severe headaches for strategic communicators, often trying to provide one message to domestic publics but another to a foreign audience or even an adversary. As a result, the international, regional and local media feature more and more in the media relations strategy.

Fourth pillar: Influence activity

Increasingly touted as ‘influence activity’, the fourth pillar of military information operations focuses on influencing the will of an enemy, but more increasingly of a host nation’s population, capturing their ‘hearts and minds’.

It is categorised as an integrating strategy, as opposed to a capability, and the tools available for such come from a wide spectrum. Actions to influence the will traditionally make use of psychological operations (psyops), electronic warfare (EW), operational security (OPSEC), computer network operations (CNO), kinetic targeting and deception. However, ‘force presence, posture and profile’ along with media operations are also considered in the mix.

Of these information operations, Psyops probably has the highest profile, often linked to propaganda. The field stretches from ‘white’ psyops – placing stories, features, pamphlets, internet sites and the like where the source, be it the US marines or the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), is fully visible – through to ‘black’ psyops – in which the same channels may be used but the source is hidden. Notably, both black and white psyops are grounded in ‘credible truth’.

The former, much more commonly used, is not so different from traditional PR, while the latter can open a whole can of worms, as did the covert placing of stories, originating from the US military, in the Iraqi press in 2005.

Deception

Deception is much more straightforward. It is the military use of assets to ‘fool’ an adversary through outright lying, if necessary. Operating at the tactical level, through ’spoofing’ on communication circuits, to the strategic, such as the coalition military preparing to liberate Kuwait in 1991 which made several signals, including through the conventional media, which indicating that the invasion would come from the sea in a massive amphibious landing.

It didn’t. But that example is illustrative of the fact that deception might be formulated through all the information operations channels and more. It is deception, seen as a legitimate strategy, which tarnishes much of military information operations, especially psyops, with the brush of propaganda, spin and lies. However, it must be said that modern militaries are waking up to the fact that the information age is increasingly demanding credibility, and therefore truth, of its participants.

Although still largely outside the dominant management coalition, strategic communication is increasingly seen as a vital component of achieving objectives, through ’soft power’.

The US is adopting a more ‘diplomatic’ approach, within which communication has a major role, although funding for such an approach is yet to be forthcoming. The idea of communication forming a mainstay of foreign policy interventions has been especially supported by the latest generation of senior military officers, saying in regard to Iraq: “We can no longer kill ourselves out of here,” and the notion that the Afghan campaign should, first and foremost, be an ‘information’ campaign. The US military has looked closely at utilising lessons and practices gleaned from Madison Avenue.

Further, the growing realisation of the power of social media is also creating new, if still clumsy, approaches to strategic communication.

NATO has recently enhanced its online presence; many foreign policy agencies are now Twittering; military personnel are blogging. The phrase ‘digital diplomacy’ is increasingly heard in foreign ministries.

Examples include the Israeli government hiring numerous internet savvy students to blog and Twitter their way to dominance in the online Arab-Israeli debate. Even China’s People’s Liberation Armys is attempting to build its reputation via the internet. Yet, these ideas and actions have yet to be really brought together as a ’strategic’ capability.

China's military - now online, in English

Foreign policy strategic communication is complex and challenging but it is no more propaganda than PR is ’spin’. PR and foreign policy strategic communication are close relatives, almost twins, but they operate in very different contexts. A failure in one can see a hard earned corporate reputation in tatters, and billions wiped off share prices. A failure in the other might result in severe hardship, suffering and even death to many. One may face sophisticated and vocal activists with widespread support. The other may face insurgents with rocket-propelled grenades.

Yet this doesn’t detract from the fact that these relatives are so close, and even more importantly, could learn from each other.

This article appears in the Sept/Oct 2009 edition of Profile magazine

Review – War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age

There is one book that should be recommended to newly appointed public affairs officers; “The Utility of Force” by Rupert Smith.  Smith’s erudite vision of ‘war amongst the peoples’ is a vital backdrop to modern military public affairs.  However, whilst Smith’s book does elude to the media and the ‘theatre’ of war, it does not examine the phenomena in detail, being outside the scope of his excellent book.

Now that gap has been filled and one more book can be added to the list of recommendations: Rid and Hecker’s “War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age”.

The authors’ grasp of the nexus of modern warfare and information is well presented, making a clear and easily understood delineation between what they call War 1.0, the industrial use of force throughout the 20^th century, and War 2.0, 21^st century irregular war and counterinsurgency, fought ‘amongst the peoples’, peoples who now have an extraordinary access to information.  Such a deep analysis is timely, given the intense debate within the US and NATO over future strategy, especially in Afghanistan.  Rid and Hecker’s work on what is a seismic shift in the conduct of modern war, should rightly inform that debate, one which is moving ahead swiftly, riding a wave of civilian surge and non-kinetic approaches to counterinsurgency and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction.

The case studies, using the US, UK and Israeli militaries and also Hezbollah, the Taliban and Al-Qaida, provide ample evidence of the complexity of information in irregular warfare, and the oft-misunderstood deeper consequences of it.  As they point out, in less than a decade three wars involving sophisticated militaries and insurgents have raged amid the vortex of perhaps the most fundamental information revolution in history.  They explore the effects of such on organization, politics, strategy, implementation and objectives.

From a military viewpoint, the book is replete with examples where the provision of information, via media or otherwise, to the local population is in fact of higher operational priority than such provision to a home audience.  Public affairs now directly influence military outcomes, a point Smith would concede.  Many military personnel realize that information can’t be controlled, that speed of response is crucial, that release authority should be as low as possible.  In short, seeing the public as the new centre of gravity, many do ‘get it’.  However, it is argued that conceptual, cultural, organizational and political resistance prevent the more effective use of information in a media (both traditional and new)-saturated age.  Whilst extolling the many virtues of new technologies, equally Rid and Hecker point out the dangers, especially in the US, of over-reliance on new media as a solution and warn of it being over-rated or, at the very least, used without the full understanding of its nature, especially regarding a media-savvy enemy.  Further, they warn of information and communication being overly concerned with the domestic audience and often being largely politically, as opposed to militarily, driven, especially in the case of the UK.  However, whilst Rid and Hecker’s analysis is sound, their concerns over the capabilities of military public affairs officers, many of whom do ‘get it’, are sometimes a little harsh.

On the opposing side, their examination makes it clear that Hezbollah has made information a centerpiece of its operations, from simple techniques, such as branded material, to the more sophisticated, via mainstream television and internet activities.  Similarly, they contend that the Taliban have also undergone a transformation, from being media–shy to avidly exploiting it, along with hi-tech activities available in a burgeoning new media, especially SMS, market.

For Al-Qaida, the authors argue that the consequences of the information age have gone deeper.  The strategic transformation of Al-Qaida from a hierarchical organization to a cellular one, relies heavily, and utilizes efficiently, web technology – allowing the ‘community’ to focus on ideas, common purpose, participation and ‘fuzzy membership’, epitomized by ‘electronic jihad’, as opposed to strict edicts and protocols transmitted via easily compromised methods.

However, whilst the nature of new media may suit insurgents, Rid and Hecker make the cogent argument that the challenges of the contemporary information environment have posed problems for the insurgent and terrorist.  Strategic inertia, loss of control, heightened political risk and management of globalised themes all have their impact on the effectiveness of the message.

Rupert Smith - 'war amongst the people' a common thread throughout War 2.0

Whilst Rid and Hecker’s recommendations are unfortunately not explored in great detail, they are insightful, for military public affairs officers, strategists, senior officers and policy-makers.  Their recommendations are thread with considered approaches to modern technology and core practices recognized by any public relations practitioner but they are also reminiscent of a well known military doctrine, that of Mission Command.   They promote decentralisation, freedom, speed of action, delegation, initiative and the acceptance of a degree of risk – all virtues of Mission Command but rarely used in the practice of military information and communication.   One only needs to have read their compelling case studies to agree that such virtues are vital in the information age.

Timely, evidence-driven, clear and concise, “War 2.0” challenges the ideas and protocols of the 20^th century, dragging us into the modern reality inhabited by ‘digital natives’, and is recommended reading for all, young and old, involved in or studying the conduct of irregular warfare.  And along with their doctrinal notes from staff college, public affairs officer should now add one more book to their compulsory reading list.

Symposium – Winning the communications war: new thinking and new practice

The Inaugural Media Operations and Public Affairs Symposium
20 – 21 January 2010
Venue: Defence Academy of United Kingdom
“Winning the communications war: new thinking and new practice “

The battle for ideas, hearts and minds is back in centre stage in twenty first century military operations. Experience in engaging the local populace in Iraq and Afghanistan has shown that well-executed public communications are critical to shaping operational and strategic outcomes. As a result, ad-hoc approaches to military PR are giving way to deliberate strategies developed using innovative planning approaches and supported by analysis and effects monitoring techniques. New cross-disciplinary thinking is emerging from both academia and government, focused on coordinating and maximising the power of messaging in counter- insurgency, anti-terrorism and global security. A revolution in military communications is underway, transforming the way governments and militaries communicate. Against this backdrop the Defence Academy is presenting the inaugural Media Operations and Public Affairs Symposium. A networking forum for stakeholders from across the communications spectrum, this new symposium is designed to showcase cutting edge thinking alongside innovative tools and techniques.

"After I've watched 'Mother-in-law was also once the Daughter-in-law' and then voted for 'Afghan Star', you've possibly got a minute or two of my attention so, go on then, persuade me!"

Over two days, the tactical, operational and strategic aspects of communication will be explored: Identifying best practice in recent Media Operations; developing supporting theory for the emerging discipline of Strategic Communications; examining new approaches to both Media Operations and Strategic Communications and application to current conflicts. The current operational context in Afghanistan is of special interest and raises a number of questions which the symposium will explore, for example: How can strategic communication objectives be pursued whilst working in a media environment with shortened time horizons and intense tactical engagement? How can two way models of communication be adopted and accommodated within the new information environment? What are the relative strengths and weaknesses of competing media and information strategies in Afghanistan? What is the role of local media in Afghanistan?

For further details Contact Caroline Dawson on:
T: +44(0) 1793 785268
E: caroline@symposiaatshrivenham.com

or visit the website www.symposiaatshrivenham.com

Abstacts should be submitted by 6 November 2009

Mission Command in Strategic Communications

Mission Command.  Most military personnel in modern armed forces, certainly in the West, understand it.  It constitutes a style of military command promoting decentralisation, freedom, speed of action, delegation and initiative. Subordinates, understanding the commander’s intentions, their own missions and the context of those missions, are told what effect they are to achieve and the reason why it needs to be achieved.  Indeed, most civilians will recognise it, practisng ‘management by objectives’ or the management concept of empowerment.

A bright lad, our Mr Clausewitz.

Originating in Clausewitz’s 19th century German armed forces, known as auftragstaktik, mission command works ideally in high tempo and complex warfare.  Although the ‘thousand-mile screwdriver’ is still commonplace in military operations, and in corporate affairs, high ranking political officials would never dream of attempting to dictate to the soldier on the ground how to achieve his objective – even though, as per Clausewitz, “war is an extension of politics by another means”.  It works because of highly specific objectives and a confidence in highly trained and experienced operatives, allowing for a serious degree of delegation.

Today’s warfare, ‘War 2.0′, is a far cry from  that of the age of industrial force-on-force struggle.  In counter-insurgency, operations other than war, ‘war amongst the people’ and the like, communication, both simple and hi-tech (from the tribal gathering to the Second-Life propaganda) has become a major feature of conduct of warfare, conflict, call it what you want.  As is increasingly becoming apparent in docrine, opinion, papers and at conferences, communication – stratcom, influence, public affairs, public diplomacy – is as considerable a factor, or operational capability, as tanks, bullets and bombs.  However, whilst the latter are often utilised under the code of Mission Command, the former is not.

The tight, codified, process-driven and hierarchical systems within with military communication stymies any real effectiveness in War 2.0 – a fast and dynamic environment in which the ‘enemy’ may, as well as having the flexibility and responsiveness afforded by decentralisation, freedom, speed of action, delegation and initiative (sounds familiar? – see the first paragraph), have as good, if not better, capabilities than the modern fighting forces.  Indeed, modern fighting forces, are hamstrung for may immovable factors  – politics, enemy capabilities, inherent communicative advantages afforded to insurgents etc – but there is one area, command style, which is in the gift of modern fighting forces to change.   The concept is well practised and widely applied, but can the style of mission command extend to communications?

Of course, mission command requires a degree of specific guidance!

There is an argument that communication is too strategically potent or politically sensitive – what is said, what is perceived, what is seen on the battlefield may have strategic effect – it may even make a Minister/Senator or a government policy look bad.  But today, with the concept of the ’strategic corporal’ ever present, in which the tactical military actions of very junior personnel have the capacity to bring about huge strategic impact, the same can be applied to any military action.  Thus, why should the command and management of military communication (public affairs, info ops etc) be any different to other traditional military function?

Political sensitivity, organisational culture, lack of a professionalism (in the strict sense of the word) – these all contribute to the inertia, the inability of the hierachy to’ let go’.  But the signs are there.  Without decentralisation, freedom of action, speed, delegation and iniative afforded to professional and highly trained operators, then the command style will continue to restrict progress in strategic communications, regardless of how good the ‘message’ is.  Applying mission command to strategic communications is not straightforward, but acknowledging that a lack of it, or certainly its ethos, is a first step.  There will be immovable obstacles (some there for good reason), but examining where elements of mission command style could be employed in communications may just break a logjam of our own making.

World without Walls – International Congress on Interdependence and Cultural Diplomacy

The Instutute for Cultural Diplomacy in Berlin is hosting an International Congress on Interdependence and Cultural Diplomacy from November 6-9^th. “A World without Walls”, hosted in honor of the 20 year anniversary of the fall of the Berlin wall, will bring together an international group of young leaders, political and diplomatic representatives and individuals from the private sector and civil society for a four-day program of lectures and seminars in Germany’s capital.

During the program, participants will consider the development of international relations over the past two decades, explore the challenges and opportunities of interdependence, and look at the importance of cultural diplomacy in ensuring sustainable multilateral cooperation. The speakers at the event will be leading international figures from politics and academia, who will be able to add unique perspectives on these three issues under consideration.

A selection of already confirmed speakers can be found below:

• Mr. Janez Janša, Former Prime Minister of Slovenia; President of the Slovenian Democratic Party
• Mike Kenneth Moore, Former Prime Minister of New Zealand, Former Director-General of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
• President Dr. Alfredo Palacio, Former President of Ecuador, Former Vice President of Ecuador
• President Emil Constantinescu, Former President of Romania
• President Sir James Richard Marie Mancham, Founding President of the Republic of Seychelles
• The Hon. Alan Baird Ferguson, 22nd President of the Australian Senate
• Minister Dr. Igor Lukšič, Minister of Education and Sport of Slovenia
• H.E. Yaşar Yakiş, Turkish MP, Former Foreign Minister of Turkey
• Dr. Vasile Puşcaş, Romanian Minister for European Affairs
• Zlatko Lagumdžija, Former Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Foreign Minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina
• Ioannis Kasoulides, MEP; Former Foreign Minister, 2008 Cypriot Presidential Candidate
• Danuta Maria Hübner, Polish MEP, Former Minister of European Affairs for Poland, Former EU Commissioner for Regional Policy
• Dr. Erkki Tuomioja, Member of Parliament and Former Foreign Minister of Finland

Further information can be found under: www.world-without-walls.org or contact worldwithoutwalls@culturaldiplomacy.org

Talking Track Two

Last night (Aug 17) on BBC’s Newsnight, Professor Kiron Skinner (assistant professor of political science at Carnegie Mellon University and research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University), talked of US commitment to liberal interventionsim continuing, but, with Somalia as an example, noted that the non-military dimension – development, capacity building etc – would be proportionately more pronounced.  She claimed much discussion around this, especially from the NGO world, was rife in Washington, and this included ‘on the Track Two side’.

Somalia - forgotten

CB3 initially took note because of the little hint of Somalia, in what was an Afghanistan package -elections, are we achieving anything, does liberal interventionism work?  The oft-quoted reasons for the UK, US, NATO and the rest being in Afghanistan become a little hard to swallow when Somalia is brought into focus – if we’re in Helmand for those reasons then logically we have even more reason to be in Mogadishu, right now, in force.  Explain that one, Mr Spokesperson.  Of course, Somalia hardly registers on the general public knowledge radar, so the questions are hardly raised.

However, it was the casual reference to Track Two that also caught CB3’s ear.  The presenter, Kirsty Wark, didn’t bat an eyelid, nor did her other scholarly guests (including Rory Stewart – agree with him or not, CB3 likes a maverick) but how many laymen, even in the relatively intellectual audience of Newsnight, would have picked “Track Two” up and understood what it meant?  And how many communications practitioners would readily identify it?

Whereas Track One refers to traditional diplomacy (or high level B2B), Track Two diplomacy is loosely defined as unofficial policy dialogue, focused on problem solving, in which the participants have some form of access to official policymaking circles.  Track Two refers to non-governmental, informal and unofficial contacts and activities between private citizens or groups of individuals, sometimes called ‘non-state actors.  Or, put another way: informal and unofficial interaction between private citizens or groups of people within a country or from different countries who are outside the formal governmental power structure.  Even simpler: dialogue through back channels. Whilst these definitions are so broad that any nongovernmental activity could constitute Track Two, including business contacts, citizen exchange programs, advocacy work, or religious contacts, they are often borne of a specific hard objective and that objective will entail, to a significant degree, persuasion, education, understanding, informing etc – all those objectives associated with communication.

The title may appal some but it's worth a read

Call it what you will – unofficial fireside chats, key leader engagement, cultural diplomacy – the point is that whilst communication activities press on with radio spots, leaflets, media campaigns, digital strategy  and the like, Track Two, or the corporate equivalent, continues (it always has done) away from the glare, often unnoticed.  Yet all activities may be servicing the same objective.

As a communicator, Track One, involving the big boys – the Ministers or chief execs – may be seductive but the constant but distant rumblings of Track Two should not be forgotten, should be listened to, facilitated and coordinated.  Of course, sometimes Track Two can be highly sensitive, as it was during the Oslo peace process, but at some point both overt and covert dialogue and communication must be on the same table, under the same scrutiny, synergised.  As Professor Skinner hinted, Track Two is being seriously discussed regarding Somalia.  This should be equally the case in Afghanistan, where back channels are potent.  Any major communications efforts in either ignore the effects of Track Two at their peril.

An academic study of spin

In his introduction to a 2003 edition of George Orwell’s 1984, Thomas Pynchon wrote: ‘Every day, public opinion is the target of rewritten history, official amnesia and outright lying, all of which is benevolently termed “spin”, as if it were no more harmful than a ride on a merry go round’.  Pynchon himself is an extremely publicity-averse character, suggesting his attitude towards the media, public relations and corporate marketing is hardly going to be warm.  However, his comments regarding spin do not exist in a philosophical wilderness; many others, from academic to layman, support his sentiment.  As the title of Ewen’s seminal book “PR! A Social History of Spin” (1996) demonstrates, in the minds of many, the practice of public relations remains interwoven with the idea of spin.

Spin, in its communicative context, is a relatively new term for an ancient aspect of human interaction.  The notion of presenting oneself, an idea or a product, in the best possible light, through Machiavellian methods, is as old as history, demonstrated in all from the mundane, as in inter-personal courtship, through to that affecting society as a whole, as in political propaganda.  Its modern incantation represents ‘a lack of substance, interpretation parading as fact, image creation at the expense of tangible evidence’ (Pitcher, 2003, p. 5).

The Dodgy Dossier - spun and sexed up

When attached to public relations, this notion is given special pejorative attention, with connotations of media manipulation, downright lies, ‘sexing up’, deception and economy of truth.  It also appears as a mainstay of propaganda, aimed at promoting a doctrine, a core subject of Orwell’s 1984.  Indeed 1984, inspired by the societal and political structure of the Soviet Union, presents a world dominated by propaganda, taken by Pynchon to be exercised in contemporary public relations.  There are many examples, such as Alistair Campbell’s ‘Dodgy Dossier’ of 2003 over Iraqi military capabilities and multiple alleged cases of corporate ‘Greenwash’ involving companies such as Shell and Monsanto, which may support Pynchon’s statement and organizations such as Spinwatch and the media themselves are highly aware of spin’s reality.

Public relations undoubtedly suffers being tarnished by the obvious reality of spin, but the real case for such spin deeply manipulating public opinion in modern liberal democracies is undermined by two factors; the nature of contemporary public relations and the complexity of the construction of public opinion.  In tackling the question precisely, the former will be examined in detail, with reference to the latter.  The methodology will be to examine theoretical aspects of public relations, examining the scope for spin, and then cover the realities of modern public relations in relation to spin within the contemporary communications context applicable to liberal democracies.

The work of Edward Bernays, evocative of a degree of social control via communications, gives credence to many claims that public relations has always welcomed the art of spin in its practice (Ewen, 1996).  However, the late twentieth century has seen the embrace of the Grunigian paradigm, enveloped within systems theory, which now seems to pervade modern public relations teaching and theory, representing the mix of methods found in modern public relations. Of the one-way communicative models, Press Agentry or Publicity are susceptible to untruths in order to gain profile, whereas Public Information is largely factual within a liberal democracy, if possibly selectively so.  It is of note that, as Kitchen and Papasolomou (1999, p.343) claim, in the US public relations is largely seen as publicity, possibly revealing an increased susceptibility to spin. Two-way asymmetrical methods specialise in examining ways in which publics may be persuaded to conform to an idea or product.  It is here that spin may be identified as a means, after risk analysis.  Two-way symmetrical methods aim to bring the opinions or attitudes of publics and an organization closer together.  Of these approaches, the first three present scope for spin, whereas highly normative two-way symmetrical methods present themselves as less so.  However, this last method has come in for criticism as being utopian, with claims that  public relations are “necessarily partisan and intrinsically undemocratic”. (L’Etang 1996, cited in Grunig, 2001, p. 16).  The implication here is that such partisanship may usher in the idea of spin to achieve that party’s objectives, regardless of method employed  However, it can be argued that the principle of two-way symmetrical approaches methodologically reduces the ability or reasons to spin.

Plato had a few things to say about rhetoric

Other inter-related theories appear to present less scope for spin, alluding to principles of two-way symmetrical communication.  Rhetoric, seen by Gregory (2002) as the dominant practice of public relations, in which truth is said to remain after debate (Moloney, 2004, p. 39), appears to possess less propensity to spin, with the credibility of a source being at its heart.  Indeed, Heath (2001, p.32) claims that advocacy is key to rhetoric and that a legitimate battle of persuasive argument, allowing active multi-party participation and scrutiny of communicative messages, creates an environment not conducive to spin.  However, the art of such persuasive communication is, in its modern sense, often accused of presenting style over substance, although not necessarily spin.

Relationship management takes a view of complex but mutually supportive relationship networks, in which organizations and publics tend towards ‘co-orientation’ (Cutlip et al, 1999).  This theory relies upon two-way communications but is instinctively appreciative of mutual obligations and debts and relies on a significant degree of openness.  This approach does not encourage spin, as deep and complex relationships cannot survive under its shadow.

As in most studies of social science, critical perspectives are rightly given space to challenge the dominant paradigms.  Postmodernists regard two-way symmetric communications as unrealistic and utopian in an ever complex and fast-moving environment in which meta-narratives have little chance to gain a deep hold on society.  The Frankfurt School, especially Jurgen Habermas, have expounded on various critical theories.  Habermas’s ‘public sphere’ concept is worthy of mention, claiming the chattering tea-houses of middle-class, bourgeois western societies create their own communicative arena, the ‘public sphere’, which in the twentieth century came under threat from political and economic forces, imposing order on the mob via propaganda and spin (Habermas, 1992).  However, Habermas’s theory has been reviewed in light of the rise of information and communication technology (ICT) which has the potential to re-energise, to a degree, the ‘public sphere’ within chatrooms and blogs, an aspect to which we will return later.

The main theories have been skated over for evidence of the possibility or propensity for spin.  Although the full expanse of the Grunigian paradigm may be somewhat unrealistic, Grunig’s assessment of public relations generally practicing varying degrees of both one-way and two-way communication is widely accepted. By and large, to use the systems theory paradigm as a template, the one-way transmission systems are possibly laid open to abuse by spin.  By comparison, forms of two-way symmetrical communication, with their emphasis on dialogue, relationship-building and debate appear much more resistant to spin.  Thus, the claim that public relations is no more that potentially spin-ridden one-way communication, evident in Orwell’s 1984, is theoretically flawed, with modern public relations in liberal democracies operating within theories encouraging spin-resistant approaches, with a scope theoretically exceeding that indicated by the term spin.

That is the theory.  But reality and practices need scrutiny.

There has been a recognizable shift by practitioners to re-align themselves away from the methods of one-way and asymmetric methods, especially that of press agentry, to provide distance from the smear of spin (Wood, 2006, p. 540).  In essence this has produced a migration into the territory of dialogue, relationship-building and debate.  However, that reality does not mean spin has been totally expunged in practice.  For example, whilst rhetoric in ideal circumstances may be seen as spin-free, the harsh, cold reality of communicative inequality or power, in which other parties are not resourced or availed of information, make the debate in which truth should prevail rather one-sided (Moloney, 2006, p. 39).  As such, rhetoric can in practice be susceptible to spin.  Similarly, the soft-sounding term ‘relationship management’ does not necessarily guarantee truthful exchange, free of spin.  The partisanship issue is founded in reality, in which business and politics are generally zero-sum games and whereby benefits are not equitably shared.

Friedman - business is business is business

As Milton Friedman allegedly claimed, ‘the business of business is business’ and although this may be somewhat brittle a statement, the sentiment is indicative of the advantage or profit that organizations will always seek, some falling for spin under the approach that the ends justify the means.  This equally applies in the area of government lobbying, in which leverage may sometimes be applied via unethical practices, including patronage, favours and spin.

The predominant systems theory itself, as already indicated, proves to be a case of communicative idealism when presented with reality.  As Moloney (2006, p.168) states:

“PR teachers and students glide over the statement that three parts of the Grunigian typology are pathologies of the fourth and not much practised part (two-way symmetrical).  By dint of exposure and repetition, the ‘ought’ of the fourth has become the ‘is’ of the other three.”

However, it is the literature of academics, lectures of teachers and studies of public relations students which present the critical aspect of public relations and its relationship with spin – ethics.  As normative as theories of public relations may be, it is the study and encouragement of ethics within the study and practice of public relations which indicate its growing aversion to the practice of spin.  The teaching of ethical decision-making processes, such as the Potter Box model and the Navron model, are demonstrative of public relations taking its responsibilities as an ethical practice seriously.  Self-regulatory codes of practice, such as that upheld by the Chartered Institute of Public Relations (CIPR) and the Global Protocol on Ethics in Public Relations upheld by the Global Alliance for Public Relations and Communication Management, encourage ethical practice.  Indeed, the academic development in this area has resulted in ethical theories of public relations.  Responsible advocacy charges practitioners with loyalty to those they represent but also to stakeholders at large and enlightened self-interest follows that an ethical approach will result in success.  The rhetorical or adversarial approach may embrace ethics through the idea that practitioners act as barristers in an arena of conflicting messages and, unsurprisingly, proponents of two-way symmetrical communications view this as a valid ethical approach.

Another case of relationship-building, or more accurately a widening of the pool of publics to include those not of immediate value to organizations, has been the increasing emphasis on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a public relations function.  A degree of ethical practice may underpin CSR and in practical terms CSR appears to be a good example of a shift away from asymmetry to less-spin prone dialogue, relationship-building and debate.  However, the real effects remain difficult to measure and the motivations for CSR itself present several paradoxes when seen under an ethical spotlight.  This has meant that although the practices of CSR may seem less susceptible to spin, the entire concept is sometimes seen as a larger conspiratorial spin agenda (Frankental, 2001, pp. 18-23).

Corporate Social Responsibility

The import of these theories in practice is their mere consideration and instruction.  Under codes of conduct and ethical considerations, public relations practice generally, and especially in the field of dialogue, relationship-building and debate, is embracing the notion of spin being utterly unacceptable.  But are public relations practitioners practicing what they preach?

Literature is replete with examples of spin, from the ‘Spinocchio’ of New Labour (Franklin, 2004, p.55) to the plethora of corporate cases identified by Stauber and Rampton (2004).  Lower profile, non-newsworthy cases of public relations practitioners conducting genuine dialogue, relationship-building and debate are less immediately apparent.  This fact itself contributes to the sentiment evident in Pychon’s statement.  However, there is evidence to counter Pychon, presented in the way in which many organizations operate in a largely open and honest manner with regard to their publics.  Good examples are that of Toyota, apparent through its 2010 Global Vision and its guiding principles (Toyota, 2007) and, surprisingly, Shell.  In the latter’s case, despite accusations of ‘greenwash’, it revolutionised its communication practices to forge dialogue and engagement after the Brent Spa case of 1995, which resulted in Shell being voted ‘Britain’s Most Admired Company in 2001 by Management Today (Barry, 2005, p. 14).  Further, in the area of crisis communications, where organizations are at most under pressure to pump out spin, there is significant evidence that openness, dialogue and clarity are often the preferred option.  One seminal case, used as an example of how to conduct crisis communications, is that of the Tylenol crisis of 1982. More recently, the response of Mattel to a product recall crisis, regardless of criticism of the practicalities of its crisis communications, exemplified an openness which some have seen as most welcome (Kosky, 2007, p.15).

Thus, although stark evidence of public relations practices avoiding spin is hard to come by – after all, there is not a ‘good PR practice watch’ website – they can be found and anecdotal evidence is available, even amongst a spin-aware audience.

Orwell based his predictions on a period of suppression for the social ‘public sphere’, rife with the ideas of Bernays and typified by social systems such as Nazism and Communism.  Pynchon’s statement takes little account of contemporary tectonic shifts of the communicative context within which spin, and by inference, public relations functions.  To understand the contemporary relationship between spin and public relations, and the manner in which public opinion is formed, this context must also be considered.

Pychon’s statement claims a power of spin, a notion that proactive, targeted communications or public relations can fully form a generally accepted narrative or world-view, which may be over-rated in today’s communicative environment.  Just as the modern social ‘public sphere’ of the information age is providing publics with a plethora of communicative links, dialogue, relationship-building and debate is becoming common between publics about organizations, as opposed to with organizations.  History is no longer necessarily written by the victors, lies are quickly exposed or met with widely–communicated counter-claims, and amnesia is refused as information sourcing becomes widespread.  Hence, on the one hand, the environment in which public relations practitioners could, if desired, conduct spin operations to form public opinion appears to be much less amenable to spin itself.   On the other hand, a typical postmodernist reproach could be that communicative anarchy, awash with spin from all, is a more realistic environment.  That philosophical debate is beyond the scope of this paper and for the purposes of our examination, we shall assume that ICT can lead to a greater openness and democratization of society if it provides unlimited access to information and equal participation  in cultural discourse.

However, whilst access and equality may dampen official spin, the human being is ingenious, and although this environment has changed in one way, in another it has enabled another entry point for the historically spin-susceptible one-way communicators.  With the fragmentation of media outlets in the face of pressure from ICT, the journalistic vanguards against spin are much depleted and non-existent amongst the new entrants (Street, 2001, p. 149).  While the environment is fragmented yet almost real-time, the thirst for information, copy and access has brought about the PR-isation of the media, be it official or amateur (Moloney, 2004, p. 152).  This developing relationship between the media, traditional or new, and public relations appears to be shifting power to the latter and nurturing a relationship in which spin may be encouraged.

Yet, even in the face of possible PR-isation, corporate scandals such as WorldCom and Enron, which were perceived to be awash with spin, and the ‘Dodgy Dossier’ have resulted in publics becoming much more spin-aware as well as media-savvy.  In response, apart from ethical considerations, public relations practitioners are increasingly seeing the practical futility of spin, or at least the disastrous consequences of failed spin, and embracing clarity and explanation in its place (Collis, 2004, p.64).

This lot are getting spin aware

Increased interdependence, pluralism and individualism, along with globalization have also changed the social environment, far removing it from the propaganda-rich world postulated by Orwell.  The modern social environment is such that persuasion, spin and propaganda, or even more benign public relations practice, has limited capabilities.  Such an example is cited by Moloney (2004, p. 67) in which published opinion, generated by agents of communication, in Denmark’s Euro referendum of 2000, was very different from actual public opinion, the opinion of a spin-aware, interdependent, pluralistic and individualist public.  This instance, and similar repeated frequently and widely, flies in the face of Pynchon’s gloomy assessment.  In the eyes of an ever more spin-savvy public, as Pitcher notes, the profile of spin itself, and the development of spin-culture, has damaged the reputation of those who wield it (Pitcher, 2003, p. 248).

In summary, spin is an inherent aspect of the human condition, from facing a job interview to conducting a government public information programme.  Spin will remain in the public relations arsenal.  However, the communications environment in which spin may exist is much changed from the time of Orwell’s writing, making successful spin, on balance, more difficult, and official spin in general more recognisable.  Further evidence in practical conduct of public relations shows that it is not the limit of public relations.  The Grunigian paradigm, although utopian, is a far cry from the practices of Bernays, and is actively encouraged within the public relations industry.  Out of this typology, the practices of dialogue, relationship-building and debate are seen as increasingly predominant forces within public relations.  Alongside this, ethics are becoming a mainstay of education and practice of public relations.  The ideas behind these practices and ethics, spurning spin, are pervading contemporary definitions of public relations.  The most popular definitions, nominally those of the World Assembly of PR Associations, the Public Relations Society of America (PRSA) and CIPR all include at their cores, sentiments of interaction, mutual understanding, public interest and relationship-building.

As can be seen above, in practice, theory and definition, the scope of contemporary public relations far exceeds, even shuns, the dark art of spin.  But spin remains and due to the very nature and frailties of human nature and its practice of communications, will not go away.

Bibliography

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FRANKENTAL, P. “Corporate Social Responsibility – A PR Invention?” in Corporate Communications: An International Journal, MCB UP, 2001

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KOSKY, H. “Only the Fittest will Survive” in Digital Essays, PR Week, December 2007

MOLONEY, K. Rethinking Public Relations (2^nd Ed), Routledge, 2006

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STAUBER, J. and RAMPTON, S. Toxic Sludge is Good for You: Lies, Damn Lies and the Public Relations Industry (UK Ed), Constable & Robinson, 2004.

STREET, J. Mass Media, Politics and Democracy, Palgrave, 2001

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TOYOTA, http://www.toyota.co.jp/en/environment/vision/plan/