Afghanistan Matters – A little story of hope

Poignant video, winner of Afghanistan Matters video contest – appears a little military to start but moves on to the human aspect.

 

What lies Beneath

The bloody summer in Afghanistan and elections in Iran have recently brought communications within the foreign policy arena back into the spotlight, showing public relations and strategic communication to be close,if sometimes misunderstood, relatives.

Establishing a radio station to persuade locals not to support pirates; justifying heavy combat operations while trying to convince homeless villagers to support your side; convincing an enemy that his cause is doomed; maintaining domestic public support for an unpopular and difficult foreign policy; encouraging populations to embrace ideas conflicting with their traditional culture; supporting repressed publics in their pursuit of freedom.

These are examples of a field of communications which rarely grace the pages of PR and communications magazines, but which feature heavily in the daily news intake of big and disparate publics, and have the potential to influence the very future of global geopolitics.

This field of foreign policy communication is known within the practising community as ’strategic communication’.

Outside the field there are terms well recognised by PR practitioners, even laymen – propaganda, nation-branding, psychological operations – terms that give a taster, but rarely provide the full flavour, of a complex communication arena. Likewise, there are fragments which can cumulatively paint the environment of strategic communication – the child soldier laden with ammunition and an AK47; sparkling white United Nation aid convoys trailing through arid, burnt scrubland; a battered but prized radio spouting the scratchy tones of the BBC World Service. These images might evoke emotive responses but they do little to explain strategic communication.

The precise definition of strategic communication is debatable, but put simply, it is the use of communication, in all its guises, to support and achieve foreign policy objectives.

Due to the variety of subject areas, from climate change to assuaging warring factions’, the variety of factors – including Non Governmental Organisations, states, terrorist groups, diasporas and global institutions; and the variety of publics, from the hi-tech media savvy Iranian teenager to the illiterate Sudanese goatherd, the field, operating globally by definition, rightly deserves the label ’strategic’. To unravel the concept, it’s worthwhile examining a simple but effective model, breaking it into four constituent pillars, some of which PR practitioners will be very familiar with.

From the media-savvy Iranian teenager ...

First pillar: Public diplomacy

Firstly, public diplomacy seeks, through the exchange of people and ideas, to build lasting relationships and understanding of a nation’s culture, values and policies.

A term coined in the 1960s, public diplomacy gained recognition as a tool of foreign policy during the Cold War. After a hiatus during the 1990s, the aftermath of 9/11 has brought the practice back to the fore in many foreign policy establishments, making it a hot topic, including in United States diplomatic circles.

Second pillar: International broadcasting services

In close alignment with public diplomacy, the second pillar comprises international broadcasting services – BBC World, Voice of America, China’s CCTV-9 and France 24 to name a few. These governmentfunded services transmit news, information, public affairs programs and entertainment to global audiences in a variety of ways.

The influence of such services is often misjudged as being little more than of fleeting interest to bored businessmen in international hotels. But they can also be very powerful, especially if the significant penetration of BBC Pashto in Afghanistan is anything to go by.

Third pillar: Media relations

Media relations or operations are used by Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence to depict communication activities intended primarily to inform and influence domestic media and, therefore, home audiences.

... to the illiterate Sudanese goatherd.

In today’s information environment, this is a quaint idea, given that there is almost complete convergence between media available to domestic and foreign audiences.

Such convergence provides severe headaches for strategic communicators, often trying to provide one message to domestic publics but another to a foreign audience or even an adversary. As a result, the international, regional and local media feature more and more in the media relations strategy.

Fourth pillar: Influence activity

Increasingly touted as ‘influence activity’, the fourth pillar of military information operations focuses on influencing the will of an enemy, but more increasingly of a host nation’s population, capturing their ‘hearts and minds’.

It is categorised as an integrating strategy, as opposed to a capability, and the tools available for such come from a wide spectrum. Actions to influence the will traditionally make use of psychological operations (psyops), electronic warfare (EW), operational security (OPSEC), computer network operations (CNO), kinetic targeting and deception. However, ‘force presence, posture and profile’ along with media operations are also considered in the mix.

Of these information operations, Psyops probably has the highest profile, often linked to propaganda. The field stretches from ‘white’ psyops – placing stories, features, pamphlets, internet sites and the like where the source, be it the US marines or the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), is fully visible – through to ‘black’ psyops – in which the same channels may be used but the source is hidden. Notably, both black and white psyops are grounded in ‘credible truth’.

The former, much more commonly used, is not so different from traditional PR, while the latter can open a whole can of worms, as did the covert placing of stories, originating from the US military, in the Iraqi press in 2005.

Deception

Deception is much more straightforward. It is the military use of assets to ‘fool’ an adversary through outright lying, if necessary. Operating at the tactical level, through ’spoofing’ on communication circuits, to the strategic, such as the coalition military preparing to liberate Kuwait in 1991 which made several signals, including through the conventional media, which indicating that the invasion would come from the sea in a massive amphibious landing.

It didn’t. But that example is illustrative of the fact that deception might be formulated through all the information operations channels and more. It is deception, seen as a legitimate strategy, which tarnishes much of military information operations, especially psyops, with the brush of propaganda, spin and lies. However, it must be said that modern militaries are waking up to the fact that the information age is increasingly demanding credibility, and therefore truth, of its participants.

Although still largely outside the dominant management coalition, strategic communication is increasingly seen as a vital component of achieving objectives, through ’soft power’.

The US is adopting a more ‘diplomatic’ approach, within which communication has a major role, although funding for such an approach is yet to be forthcoming. The idea of communication forming a mainstay of foreign policy interventions has been especially supported by the latest generation of senior military officers, saying in regard to Iraq: “We can no longer kill ourselves out of here,” and the notion that the Afghan campaign should, first and foremost, be an ‘information’ campaign. The US military has looked closely at utilising lessons and practices gleaned from Madison Avenue.

Further, the growing realisation of the power of social media is also creating new, if still clumsy, approaches to strategic communication.

NATO has recently enhanced its online presence; many foreign policy agencies are now Twittering; military personnel are blogging. The phrase ‘digital diplomacy’ is increasingly heard in foreign ministries.

Examples include the Israeli government hiring numerous internet savvy students to blog and Twitter their way to dominance in the online Arab-Israeli debate. Even China’s People’s Liberation Armys is attempting to build its reputation via the internet. Yet, these ideas and actions have yet to be really brought together as a ’strategic’ capability.

China's military - now online, in English

Foreign policy strategic communication is complex and challenging but it is no more propaganda than PR is ’spin’. PR and foreign policy strategic communication are close relatives, almost twins, but they operate in very different contexts. A failure in one can see a hard earned corporate reputation in tatters, and billions wiped off share prices. A failure in the other might result in severe hardship, suffering and even death to many. One may face sophisticated and vocal activists with widespread support. The other may face insurgents with rocket-propelled grenades.

Yet this doesn’t detract from the fact that these relatives are so close, and even more importantly, could learn from each other.

This article appears in the Sept/Oct 2009 edition of Profile magazine

Review – War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age

There is one book that should be recommended to newly appointed public affairs officers; “The Utility of Force” by Rupert Smith.  Smith’s erudite vision of ‘war amongst the peoples’ is a vital backdrop to modern military public affairs.  However, whilst Smith’s book does elude to the media and the ‘theatre’ of war, it does not examine the phenomena in detail, being outside the scope of his excellent book.

Now that gap has been filled and one more book can be added to the list of recommendations: Rid and Hecker’s “War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age”.

The authors’ grasp of the nexus of modern warfare and information is well presented, making a clear and easily understood delineation between what they call War 1.0, the industrial use of force throughout the 20^th century, and War 2.0, 21^st century irregular war and counterinsurgency, fought ‘amongst the peoples’, peoples who now have an extraordinary access to information.  Such a deep analysis is timely, given the intense debate within the US and NATO over future strategy, especially in Afghanistan.  Rid and Hecker’s work on what is a seismic shift in the conduct of modern war, should rightly inform that debate, one which is moving ahead swiftly, riding a wave of civilian surge and non-kinetic approaches to counterinsurgency and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction.

The case studies, using the US, UK and Israeli militaries and also Hezbollah, the Taliban and Al-Qaida, provide ample evidence of the complexity of information in irregular warfare, and the oft-misunderstood deeper consequences of it.  As they point out, in less than a decade three wars involving sophisticated militaries and insurgents have raged amid the vortex of perhaps the most fundamental information revolution in history.  They explore the effects of such on organization, politics, strategy, implementation and objectives.

From a military viewpoint, the book is replete with examples where the provision of information, via media or otherwise, to the local population is in fact of higher operational priority than such provision to a home audience.  Public affairs now directly influence military outcomes, a point Smith would concede.  Many military personnel realize that information can’t be controlled, that speed of response is crucial, that release authority should be as low as possible.  In short, seeing the public as the new centre of gravity, many do ‘get it’.  However, it is argued that conceptual, cultural, organizational and political resistance prevent the more effective use of information in a media (both traditional and new)-saturated age.  Whilst extolling the many virtues of new technologies, equally Rid and Hecker point out the dangers, especially in the US, of over-reliance on new media as a solution and warn of it being over-rated or, at the very least, used without the full understanding of its nature, especially regarding a media-savvy enemy.  Further, they warn of information and communication being overly concerned with the domestic audience and often being largely politically, as opposed to militarily, driven, especially in the case of the UK.  However, whilst Rid and Hecker’s analysis is sound, their concerns over the capabilities of military public affairs officers, many of whom do ‘get it’, are sometimes a little harsh.

On the opposing side, their examination makes it clear that Hezbollah has made information a centerpiece of its operations, from simple techniques, such as branded material, to the more sophisticated, via mainstream television and internet activities.  Similarly, they contend that the Taliban have also undergone a transformation, from being media–shy to avidly exploiting it, along with hi-tech activities available in a burgeoning new media, especially SMS, market.

For Al-Qaida, the authors argue that the consequences of the information age have gone deeper.  The strategic transformation of Al-Qaida from a hierarchical organization to a cellular one, relies heavily, and utilizes efficiently, web technology – allowing the ‘community’ to focus on ideas, common purpose, participation and ‘fuzzy membership’, epitomized by ‘electronic jihad’, as opposed to strict edicts and protocols transmitted via easily compromised methods.

However, whilst the nature of new media may suit insurgents, Rid and Hecker make the cogent argument that the challenges of the contemporary information environment have posed problems for the insurgent and terrorist.  Strategic inertia, loss of control, heightened political risk and management of globalised themes all have their impact on the effectiveness of the message.

Rupert Smith - 'war amongst the people' a common thread throughout War 2.0

Whilst Rid and Hecker’s recommendations are unfortunately not explored in great detail, they are insightful, for military public affairs officers, strategists, senior officers and policy-makers.  Their recommendations are thread with considered approaches to modern technology and core practices recognized by any public relations practitioner but they are also reminiscent of a well known military doctrine, that of Mission Command.   They promote decentralisation, freedom, speed of action, delegation, initiative and the acceptance of a degree of risk – all virtues of Mission Command but rarely used in the practice of military information and communication.   One only needs to have read their compelling case studies to agree that such virtues are vital in the information age.

Timely, evidence-driven, clear and concise, “War 2.0” challenges the ideas and protocols of the 20^th century, dragging us into the modern reality inhabited by ‘digital natives’, and is recommended reading for all, young and old, involved in or studying the conduct of irregular warfare.  And along with their doctrinal notes from staff college, public affairs officer should now add one more book to their compulsory reading list.

Symposium – Winning the communications war: new thinking and new practice

The Inaugural Media Operations and Public Affairs Symposium
20 – 21 January 2010
Venue: Defence Academy of United Kingdom
“Winning the communications war: new thinking and new practice “

The battle for ideas, hearts and minds is back in centre stage in twenty first century military operations. Experience in engaging the local populace in Iraq and Afghanistan has shown that well-executed public communications are critical to shaping operational and strategic outcomes. As a result, ad-hoc approaches to military PR are giving way to deliberate strategies developed using innovative planning approaches and supported by analysis and effects monitoring techniques. New cross-disciplinary thinking is emerging from both academia and government, focused on coordinating and maximising the power of messaging in counter- insurgency, anti-terrorism and global security. A revolution in military communications is underway, transforming the way governments and militaries communicate. Against this backdrop the Defence Academy is presenting the inaugural Media Operations and Public Affairs Symposium. A networking forum for stakeholders from across the communications spectrum, this new symposium is designed to showcase cutting edge thinking alongside innovative tools and techniques.

"After I've watched 'Mother-in-law was also once the Daughter-in-law' and then voted for 'Afghan Star', you've possibly got a minute or two of my attention so, go on then, persuade me!"

Over two days, the tactical, operational and strategic aspects of communication will be explored: Identifying best practice in recent Media Operations; developing supporting theory for the emerging discipline of Strategic Communications; examining new approaches to both Media Operations and Strategic Communications and application to current conflicts. The current operational context in Afghanistan is of special interest and raises a number of questions which the symposium will explore, for example: How can strategic communication objectives be pursued whilst working in a media environment with shortened time horizons and intense tactical engagement? How can two way models of communication be adopted and accommodated within the new information environment? What are the relative strengths and weaknesses of competing media and information strategies in Afghanistan? What is the role of local media in Afghanistan?

For further details Contact Caroline Dawson on:
T: +44(0) 1793 785268
E: caroline@symposiaatshrivenham.com

or visit the website www.symposiaatshrivenham.com

Abstacts should be submitted by 6 November 2009

Mission Command in Strategic Communications

Mission Command.  Most military personnel in modern armed forces, certainly in the West, understand it.  It constitutes a style of military command promoting decentralisation, freedom, speed of action, delegation and initiative. Subordinates, understanding the commander’s intentions, their own missions and the context of those missions, are told what effect they are to achieve and the reason why it needs to be achieved.  Indeed, most civilians will recognise it, practisng ‘management by objectives’ or the management concept of empowerment.

A bright lad, our Mr Clausewitz.

Originating in Clausewitz’s 19th century German armed forces, known as auftragstaktik, mission command works ideally in high tempo and complex warfare.  Although the ‘thousand-mile screwdriver’ is still commonplace in military operations, and in corporate affairs, high ranking political officials would never dream of attempting to dictate to the soldier on the ground how to achieve his objective – even though, as per Clausewitz, “war is an extension of politics by another means”.  It works because of highly specific objectives and a confidence in highly trained and experienced operatives, allowing for a serious degree of delegation.

Today’s warfare, ‘War 2.0′, is a far cry from  that of the age of industrial force-on-force struggle.  In counter-insurgency, operations other than war, ‘war amongst the people’ and the like, communication, both simple and hi-tech (from the tribal gathering to the Second-Life propaganda) has become a major feature of conduct of warfare, conflict, call it what you want.  As is increasingly becoming apparent in docrine, opinion, papers and at conferences, communication – stratcom, influence, public affairs, public diplomacy – is as considerable a factor, or operational capability, as tanks, bullets and bombs.  However, whilst the latter are often utilised under the code of Mission Command, the former is not.

The tight, codified, process-driven and hierarchical systems within with military communication stymies any real effectiveness in War 2.0 – a fast and dynamic environment in which the ‘enemy’ may, as well as having the flexibility and responsiveness afforded by decentralisation, freedom, speed of action, delegation and initiative (sounds familiar? – see the first paragraph), have as good, if not better, capabilities than the modern fighting forces.  Indeed, modern fighting forces, are hamstrung for may immovable factors  – politics, enemy capabilities, inherent communicative advantages afforded to insurgents etc – but there is one area, command style, which is in the gift of modern fighting forces to change.   The concept is well practised and widely applied, but can the style of mission command extend to communications?

Of course, mission command requires a degree of specific guidance!

There is an argument that communication is too strategically potent or politically sensitive – what is said, what is perceived, what is seen on the battlefield may have strategic effect – it may even make a Minister/Senator or a government policy look bad.  But today, with the concept of the ’strategic corporal’ ever present, in which the tactical military actions of very junior personnel have the capacity to bring about huge strategic impact, the same can be applied to any military action.  Thus, why should the command and management of military communication (public affairs, info ops etc) be any different to other traditional military function?

Political sensitivity, organisational culture, lack of a professionalism (in the strict sense of the word) – these all contribute to the inertia, the inability of the hierachy to’ let go’.  But the signs are there.  Without decentralisation, freedom of action, speed, delegation and iniative afforded to professional and highly trained operators, then the command style will continue to restrict progress in strategic communications, regardless of how good the ‘message’ is.  Applying mission command to strategic communications is not straightforward, but acknowledging that a lack of it, or certainly its ethos, is a first step.  There will be immovable obstacles (some there for good reason), but examining where elements of mission command style could be employed in communications may just break a logjam of our own making.

World without Walls – International Congress on Interdependence and Cultural Diplomacy

The Instutute for Cultural Diplomacy in Berlin is hosting an International Congress on Interdependence and Cultural Diplomacy from November 6-9^th. “A World without Walls”, hosted in honor of the 20 year anniversary of the fall of the Berlin wall, will bring together an international group of young leaders, political and diplomatic representatives and individuals from the private sector and civil society for a four-day program of lectures and seminars in Germany’s capital.

During the program, participants will consider the development of international relations over the past two decades, explore the challenges and opportunities of interdependence, and look at the importance of cultural diplomacy in ensuring sustainable multilateral cooperation. The speakers at the event will be leading international figures from politics and academia, who will be able to add unique perspectives on these three issues under consideration.

A selection of already confirmed speakers can be found below:

• Mr. Janez Janša, Former Prime Minister of Slovenia; President of the Slovenian Democratic Party
• Mike Kenneth Moore, Former Prime Minister of New Zealand, Former Director-General of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
• President Dr. Alfredo Palacio, Former President of Ecuador, Former Vice President of Ecuador
• President Emil Constantinescu, Former President of Romania
• President Sir James Richard Marie Mancham, Founding President of the Republic of Seychelles
• The Hon. Alan Baird Ferguson, 22nd President of the Australian Senate
• Minister Dr. Igor Lukšič, Minister of Education and Sport of Slovenia
• H.E. Yaşar Yakiş, Turkish MP, Former Foreign Minister of Turkey
• Dr. Vasile Puşcaş, Romanian Minister for European Affairs
• Zlatko Lagumdžija, Former Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Foreign Minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina
• Ioannis Kasoulides, MEP; Former Foreign Minister, 2008 Cypriot Presidential Candidate
• Danuta Maria Hübner, Polish MEP, Former Minister of European Affairs for Poland, Former EU Commissioner for Regional Policy
• Dr. Erkki Tuomioja, Member of Parliament and Former Foreign Minister of Finland

Further information can be found under: www.world-without-walls.org or contact worldwithoutwalls@culturaldiplomacy.org

Talking Track Two

Last night (Aug 17) on BBC’s Newsnight, Professor Kiron Skinner (assistant professor of political science at Carnegie Mellon University and research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University), talked of US commitment to liberal interventionsim continuing, but, with Somalia as an example, noted that the non-military dimension – development, capacity building etc – would be proportionately more pronounced.  She claimed much discussion around this, especially from the NGO world, was rife in Washington, and this included ‘on the Track Two side’.

Somalia - forgotten

CB3 initially took note because of the little hint of Somalia, in what was an Afghanistan package -elections, are we achieving anything, does liberal interventionism work?  The oft-quoted reasons for the UK, US, NATO and the rest being in Afghanistan become a little hard to swallow when Somalia is brought into focus – if we’re in Helmand for those reasons then logically we have even more reason to be in Mogadishu, right now, in force.  Explain that one, Mr Spokesperson.  Of course, Somalia hardly registers on the general public knowledge radar, so the questions are hardly raised.

However, it was the casual reference to Track Two that also caught CB3’s ear.  The presenter, Kirsty Wark, didn’t bat an eyelid, nor did her other scholarly guests (including Rory Stewart – agree with him or not, CB3 likes a maverick) but how many laymen, even in the relatively intellectual audience of Newsnight, would have picked “Track Two” up and understood what it meant?  And how many communications practitioners would readily identify it?

Whereas Track One refers to traditional diplomacy (or high level B2B), Track Two diplomacy is loosely defined as unofficial policy dialogue, focused on problem solving, in which the participants have some form of access to official policymaking circles.  Track Two refers to non-governmental, informal and unofficial contacts and activities between private citizens or groups of individuals, sometimes called ‘non-state actors.  Or, put another way: informal and unofficial interaction between private citizens or groups of people within a country or from different countries who are outside the formal governmental power structure.  Even simpler: dialogue through back channels. Whilst these definitions are so broad that any nongovernmental activity could constitute Track Two, including business contacts, citizen exchange programs, advocacy work, or religious contacts, they are often borne of a specific hard objective and that objective will entail, to a significant degree, persuasion, education, understanding, informing etc – all those objectives associated with communication.

The title may appal some but it's worth a read

Call it what you will – unofficial fireside chats, key leader engagement, cultural diplomacy – the point is that whilst communication activities press on with radio spots, leaflets, media campaigns, digital strategy  and the like, Track Two, or the corporate equivalent, continues (it always has done) away from the glare, often unnoticed.  Yet all activities may be servicing the same objective.

As a communicator, Track One, involving the big boys – the Ministers or chief execs – may be seductive but the constant but distant rumblings of Track Two should not be forgotten, should be listened to, facilitated and coordinated.  Of course, sometimes Track Two can be highly sensitive, as it was during the Oslo peace process, but at some point both overt and covert dialogue and communication must be on the same table, under the same scrutiny, synergised.  As Professor Skinner hinted, Track Two is being seriously discussed regarding Somalia.  This should be equally the case in Afghanistan, where back channels are potent.  Any major communications efforts in either ignore the effects of Track Two at their peril.

An academic study of spin

In his introduction to a 2003 edition of George Orwell’s 1984, Thomas Pynchon wrote: ‘Every day, public opinion is the target of rewritten history, official amnesia and outright lying, all of which is benevolently termed “spin”, as if it were no more harmful than a ride on a merry go round’.  Pynchon himself is an extremely publicity-averse character, suggesting his attitude towards the media, public relations and corporate marketing is hardly going to be warm.  However, his comments regarding spin do not exist in a philosophical wilderness; many others, from academic to layman, support his sentiment.  As the title of Ewen’s seminal book “PR! A Social History of Spin” (1996) demonstrates, in the minds of many, the practice of public relations remains interwoven with the idea of spin.

Spin, in its communicative context, is a relatively new term for an ancient aspect of human interaction.  The notion of presenting oneself, an idea or a product, in the best possible light, through Machiavellian methods, is as old as history, demonstrated in all from the mundane, as in inter-personal courtship, through to that affecting society as a whole, as in political propaganda.  Its modern incantation represents ‘a lack of substance, interpretation parading as fact, image creation at the expense of tangible evidence’ (Pitcher, 2003, p. 5).

The Dodgy Dossier - spun and sexed up

When attached to public relations, this notion is given special pejorative attention, with connotations of media manipulation, downright lies, ‘sexing up’, deception and economy of truth.  It also appears as a mainstay of propaganda, aimed at promoting a doctrine, a core subject of Orwell’s 1984.  Indeed 1984, inspired by the societal and political structure of the Soviet Union, presents a world dominated by propaganda, taken by Pynchon to be exercised in contemporary public relations.  There are many examples, such as Alistair Campbell’s ‘Dodgy Dossier’ of 2003 over Iraqi military capabilities and multiple alleged cases of corporate ‘Greenwash’ involving companies such as Shell and Monsanto, which may support Pynchon’s statement and organizations such as Spinwatch and the media themselves are highly aware of spin’s reality.

Public relations undoubtedly suffers being tarnished by the obvious reality of spin, but the real case for such spin deeply manipulating public opinion in modern liberal democracies is undermined by two factors; the nature of contemporary public relations and the complexity of the construction of public opinion.  In tackling the question precisely, the former will be examined in detail, with reference to the latter.  The methodology will be to examine theoretical aspects of public relations, examining the scope for spin, and then cover the realities of modern public relations in relation to spin within the contemporary communications context applicable to liberal democracies.

The work of Edward Bernays, evocative of a degree of social control via communications, gives credence to many claims that public relations has always welcomed the art of spin in its practice (Ewen, 1996).  However, the late twentieth century has seen the embrace of the Grunigian paradigm, enveloped within systems theory, which now seems to pervade modern public relations teaching and theory, representing the mix of methods found in modern public relations. Of the one-way communicative models, Press Agentry or Publicity are susceptible to untruths in order to gain profile, whereas Public Information is largely factual within a liberal democracy, if possibly selectively so.  It is of note that, as Kitchen and Papasolomou (1999, p.343) claim, in the US public relations is largely seen as publicity, possibly revealing an increased susceptibility to spin. Two-way asymmetrical methods specialise in examining ways in which publics may be persuaded to conform to an idea or product.  It is here that spin may be identified as a means, after risk analysis.  Two-way symmetrical methods aim to bring the opinions or attitudes of publics and an organization closer together.  Of these approaches, the first three present scope for spin, whereas highly normative two-way symmetrical methods present themselves as less so.  However, this last method has come in for criticism as being utopian, with claims that  public relations are “necessarily partisan and intrinsically undemocratic”. (L’Etang 1996, cited in Grunig, 2001, p. 16).  The implication here is that such partisanship may usher in the idea of spin to achieve that party’s objectives, regardless of method employed  However, it can be argued that the principle of two-way symmetrical approaches methodologically reduces the ability or reasons to spin.

Plato had a few things to say about rhetoric

Other inter-related theories appear to present less scope for spin, alluding to principles of two-way symmetrical communication.  Rhetoric, seen by Gregory (2002) as the dominant practice of public relations, in which truth is said to remain after debate (Moloney, 2004, p. 39), appears to possess less propensity to spin, with the credibility of a source being at its heart.  Indeed, Heath (2001, p.32) claims that advocacy is key to rhetoric and that a legitimate battle of persuasive argument, allowing active multi-party participation and scrutiny of communicative messages, creates an environment not conducive to spin.  However, the art of such persuasive communication is, in its modern sense, often accused of presenting style over substance, although not necessarily spin.

Relationship management takes a view of complex but mutually supportive relationship networks, in which organizations and publics tend towards ‘co-orientation’ (Cutlip et al, 1999).  This theory relies upon two-way communications but is instinctively appreciative of mutual obligations and debts and relies on a significant degree of openness.  This approach does not encourage spin, as deep and complex relationships cannot survive under its shadow.

As in most studies of social science, critical perspectives are rightly given space to challenge the dominant paradigms.  Postmodernists regard two-way symmetric communications as unrealistic and utopian in an ever complex and fast-moving environment in which meta-narratives have little chance to gain a deep hold on society.  The Frankfurt School, especially Jurgen Habermas, have expounded on various critical theories.  Habermas’s ‘public sphere’ concept is worthy of mention, claiming the chattering tea-houses of middle-class, bourgeois western societies create their own communicative arena, the ‘public sphere’, which in the twentieth century came under threat from political and economic forces, imposing order on the mob via propaganda and spin (Habermas, 1992).  However, Habermas’s theory has been reviewed in light of the rise of information and communication technology (ICT) which has the potential to re-energise, to a degree, the ‘public sphere’ within chatrooms and blogs, an aspect to which we will return later.

The main theories have been skated over for evidence of the possibility or propensity for spin.  Although the full expanse of the Grunigian paradigm may be somewhat unrealistic, Grunig’s assessment of public relations generally practicing varying degrees of both one-way and two-way communication is widely accepted. By and large, to use the systems theory paradigm as a template, the one-way transmission systems are possibly laid open to abuse by spin.  By comparison, forms of two-way symmetrical communication, with their emphasis on dialogue, relationship-building and debate appear much more resistant to spin.  Thus, the claim that public relations is no more that potentially spin-ridden one-way communication, evident in Orwell’s 1984, is theoretically flawed, with modern public relations in liberal democracies operating within theories encouraging spin-resistant approaches, with a scope theoretically exceeding that indicated by the term spin.

That is the theory.  But reality and practices need scrutiny.

There has been a recognizable shift by practitioners to re-align themselves away from the methods of one-way and asymmetric methods, especially that of press agentry, to provide distance from the smear of spin (Wood, 2006, p. 540).  In essence this has produced a migration into the territory of dialogue, relationship-building and debate.  However, that reality does not mean spin has been totally expunged in practice.  For example, whilst rhetoric in ideal circumstances may be seen as spin-free, the harsh, cold reality of communicative inequality or power, in which other parties are not resourced or availed of information, make the debate in which truth should prevail rather one-sided (Moloney, 2006, p. 39).  As such, rhetoric can in practice be susceptible to spin.  Similarly, the soft-sounding term ‘relationship management’ does not necessarily guarantee truthful exchange, free of spin.  The partisanship issue is founded in reality, in which business and politics are generally zero-sum games and whereby benefits are not equitably shared.

Friedman - business is business is business

As Milton Friedman allegedly claimed, ‘the business of business is business’ and although this may be somewhat brittle a statement, the sentiment is indicative of the advantage or profit that organizations will always seek, some falling for spin under the approach that the ends justify the means.  This equally applies in the area of government lobbying, in which leverage may sometimes be applied via unethical practices, including patronage, favours and spin.

The predominant systems theory itself, as already indicated, proves to be a case of communicative idealism when presented with reality.  As Moloney (2006, p.168) states:

“PR teachers and students glide over the statement that three parts of the Grunigian typology are pathologies of the fourth and not much practised part (two-way symmetrical).  By dint of exposure and repetition, the ‘ought’ of the fourth has become the ‘is’ of the other three.”

However, it is the literature of academics, lectures of teachers and studies of public relations students which present the critical aspect of public relations and its relationship with spin – ethics.  As normative as theories of public relations may be, it is the study and encouragement of ethics within the study and practice of public relations which indicate its growing aversion to the practice of spin.  The teaching of ethical decision-making processes, such as the Potter Box model and the Navron model, are demonstrative of public relations taking its responsibilities as an ethical practice seriously.  Self-regulatory codes of practice, such as that upheld by the Chartered Institute of Public Relations (CIPR) and the Global Protocol on Ethics in Public Relations upheld by the Global Alliance for Public Relations and Communication Management, encourage ethical practice.  Indeed, the academic development in this area has resulted in ethical theories of public relations.  Responsible advocacy charges practitioners with loyalty to those they represent but also to stakeholders at large and enlightened self-interest follows that an ethical approach will result in success.  The rhetorical or adversarial approach may embrace ethics through the idea that practitioners act as barristers in an arena of conflicting messages and, unsurprisingly, proponents of two-way symmetrical communications view this as a valid ethical approach.

Another case of relationship-building, or more accurately a widening of the pool of publics to include those not of immediate value to organizations, has been the increasing emphasis on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a public relations function.  A degree of ethical practice may underpin CSR and in practical terms CSR appears to be a good example of a shift away from asymmetry to less-spin prone dialogue, relationship-building and debate.  However, the real effects remain difficult to measure and the motivations for CSR itself present several paradoxes when seen under an ethical spotlight.  This has meant that although the practices of CSR may seem less susceptible to spin, the entire concept is sometimes seen as a larger conspiratorial spin agenda (Frankental, 2001, pp. 18-23).

Corporate Social Responsibility

The import of these theories in practice is their mere consideration and instruction.  Under codes of conduct and ethical considerations, public relations practice generally, and especially in the field of dialogue, relationship-building and debate, is embracing the notion of spin being utterly unacceptable.  But are public relations practitioners practicing what they preach?

Literature is replete with examples of spin, from the ‘Spinocchio’ of New Labour (Franklin, 2004, p.55) to the plethora of corporate cases identified by Stauber and Rampton (2004).  Lower profile, non-newsworthy cases of public relations practitioners conducting genuine dialogue, relationship-building and debate are less immediately apparent.  This fact itself contributes to the sentiment evident in Pychon’s statement.  However, there is evidence to counter Pychon, presented in the way in which many organizations operate in a largely open and honest manner with regard to their publics.  Good examples are that of Toyota, apparent through its 2010 Global Vision and its guiding principles (Toyota, 2007) and, surprisingly, Shell.  In the latter’s case, despite accusations of ‘greenwash’, it revolutionised its communication practices to forge dialogue and engagement after the Brent Spa case of 1995, which resulted in Shell being voted ‘Britain’s Most Admired Company in 2001 by Management Today (Barry, 2005, p. 14).  Further, in the area of crisis communications, where organizations are at most under pressure to pump out spin, there is significant evidence that openness, dialogue and clarity are often the preferred option.  One seminal case, used as an example of how to conduct crisis communications, is that of the Tylenol crisis of 1982. More recently, the response of Mattel to a product recall crisis, regardless of criticism of the practicalities of its crisis communications, exemplified an openness which some have seen as most welcome (Kosky, 2007, p.15).

Thus, although stark evidence of public relations practices avoiding spin is hard to come by – after all, there is not a ‘good PR practice watch’ website – they can be found and anecdotal evidence is available, even amongst a spin-aware audience.

Orwell based his predictions on a period of suppression for the social ‘public sphere’, rife with the ideas of Bernays and typified by social systems such as Nazism and Communism.  Pynchon’s statement takes little account of contemporary tectonic shifts of the communicative context within which spin, and by inference, public relations functions.  To understand the contemporary relationship between spin and public relations, and the manner in which public opinion is formed, this context must also be considered.

Pychon’s statement claims a power of spin, a notion that proactive, targeted communications or public relations can fully form a generally accepted narrative or world-view, which may be over-rated in today’s communicative environment.  Just as the modern social ‘public sphere’ of the information age is providing publics with a plethora of communicative links, dialogue, relationship-building and debate is becoming common between publics about organizations, as opposed to with organizations.  History is no longer necessarily written by the victors, lies are quickly exposed or met with widely–communicated counter-claims, and amnesia is refused as information sourcing becomes widespread.  Hence, on the one hand, the environment in which public relations practitioners could, if desired, conduct spin operations to form public opinion appears to be much less amenable to spin itself.   On the other hand, a typical postmodernist reproach could be that communicative anarchy, awash with spin from all, is a more realistic environment.  That philosophical debate is beyond the scope of this paper and for the purposes of our examination, we shall assume that ICT can lead to a greater openness and democratization of society if it provides unlimited access to information and equal participation  in cultural discourse.

However, whilst access and equality may dampen official spin, the human being is ingenious, and although this environment has changed in one way, in another it has enabled another entry point for the historically spin-susceptible one-way communicators.  With the fragmentation of media outlets in the face of pressure from ICT, the journalistic vanguards against spin are much depleted and non-existent amongst the new entrants (Street, 2001, p. 149).  While the environment is fragmented yet almost real-time, the thirst for information, copy and access has brought about the PR-isation of the media, be it official or amateur (Moloney, 2004, p. 152).  This developing relationship between the media, traditional or new, and public relations appears to be shifting power to the latter and nurturing a relationship in which spin may be encouraged.

Yet, even in the face of possible PR-isation, corporate scandals such as WorldCom and Enron, which were perceived to be awash with spin, and the ‘Dodgy Dossier’ have resulted in publics becoming much more spin-aware as well as media-savvy.  In response, apart from ethical considerations, public relations practitioners are increasingly seeing the practical futility of spin, or at least the disastrous consequences of failed spin, and embracing clarity and explanation in its place (Collis, 2004, p.64).

This lot are getting spin aware

Increased interdependence, pluralism and individualism, along with globalization have also changed the social environment, far removing it from the propaganda-rich world postulated by Orwell.  The modern social environment is such that persuasion, spin and propaganda, or even more benign public relations practice, has limited capabilities.  Such an example is cited by Moloney (2004, p. 67) in which published opinion, generated by agents of communication, in Denmark’s Euro referendum of 2000, was very different from actual public opinion, the opinion of a spin-aware, interdependent, pluralistic and individualist public.  This instance, and similar repeated frequently and widely, flies in the face of Pynchon’s gloomy assessment.  In the eyes of an ever more spin-savvy public, as Pitcher notes, the profile of spin itself, and the development of spin-culture, has damaged the reputation of those who wield it (Pitcher, 2003, p. 248).

In summary, spin is an inherent aspect of the human condition, from facing a job interview to conducting a government public information programme.  Spin will remain in the public relations arsenal.  However, the communications environment in which spin may exist is much changed from the time of Orwell’s writing, making successful spin, on balance, more difficult, and official spin in general more recognisable.  Further evidence in practical conduct of public relations shows that it is not the limit of public relations.  The Grunigian paradigm, although utopian, is a far cry from the practices of Bernays, and is actively encouraged within the public relations industry.  Out of this typology, the practices of dialogue, relationship-building and debate are seen as increasingly predominant forces within public relations.  Alongside this, ethics are becoming a mainstay of education and practice of public relations.  The ideas behind these practices and ethics, spurning spin, are pervading contemporary definitions of public relations.  The most popular definitions, nominally those of the World Assembly of PR Associations, the Public Relations Society of America (PRSA) and CIPR all include at their cores, sentiments of interaction, mutual understanding, public interest and relationship-building.

As can be seen above, in practice, theory and definition, the scope of contemporary public relations far exceeds, even shuns, the dark art of spin.  But spin remains and due to the very nature and frailties of human nature and its practice of communications, will not go away.

Bibliography

BARRY, A. PR Power: Inside Secrets from the World of Spin, Virgin, 2005

BOEDER, P. Habermas’s Heritage: The Future of the Public Sphere in the Network Society at http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue10_9/boeder/

COLLIS, T. “Financial Public Relations” in GREGORY, A. Public Relations in Practice (2^nd Ed), Kogan Page, 2004

CUTLIP, S., CENTER, A. and BROOM, G. Effective Public Relations (8^th Ed), Prentice Hall, 1999

EWEN, S. PR! A Social History of Spin, Basic Books, 1996

FRANKLIN, B. Packaging Politics: Political Communications in Britain’s Media Democracy (2^nd Ed), Oxford University Press, 2004.

FRANKENTAL, P. “Corporate Social Responsibility – A PR Invention?” in Corporate Communications: An International Journal, MCB UP, 2001

GREGORY, A.  To Spin or Not to Spin:  The Ethics of Public Relations, Lecture to the AGM of the Institute of Public Relations, 3 May 2002

GRUNIG, J.E. “Two-Way Symmetrical Public Relations: Past, Present and Future” in HEATH, R.L. Handbook of Public Relations, Sage, 2001

HABERMAS, J. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, Polity Press, 1992

HEATH, R.L. “A Rhetorical Enactment Rationale for Public Relations: The Good Organization Communicating Well” in HEATH, R.L. Handbook of Public Relations, Sage, 2001

KITCHEN, P. J. and PAPASOLOMOU, I. “Marketing Public Relations” in KITCHEN, P. (Ed) Marketing Communications: Principles and Practice, Thomson, 1999

KOSKY, H. “Only the Fittest will Survive” in Digital Essays, PR Week, December 2007

MOLONEY, K. Rethinking Public Relations (2^nd Ed), Routledge, 2006

PITCHER, G.  The Death of Spin, Wiley, 2003

STAUBER, J. and RAMPTON, S. Toxic Sludge is Good for You: Lies, Damn Lies and the Public Relations Industry (UK Ed), Constable & Robinson, 2004.

STREET, J. Mass Media, Politics and Democracy, Palgrave, 2001

WOOD, E. “Corporate Communications” in TENCH, R and YEOMANS, L. Exploring Public Relations, Pearson, 2006

TOYOTA, http://www.toyota.co.jp/en/environment/vision/plan/

GWU Exploring Changes in Public Diplomacy Since Nixon-Khrushchev Debate

Fifty years since the famous “Kitchen Debate” between then Vice President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, U.S. public diplomacy has significantly changed to include new media tactics such as Facebook and Twitter. A conference hosted by The George Washington University’s Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communications, “Face-off to Facebook: From the Nixon-Khrushchev Kitchen Debate to Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century,” will mark the 50th anniversary of the debate and examine new opportunities for U.S. global outreach in a Web 2.0 world.

Public diplomacy has come a long way from here ...

The all-day conference will be held Thursday, July 23, 2009, at GW’s Jack Morton Auditorium. The morning session will explore the historical perspectives of U.S.-Soviet relations in the summer of 1959, the height of the Cold War. The Sokolniki Park Exhibition, made famous by Nixon and Khrushchev’s impromptu verbal sparring match, will also be celebrated. The afternoon session will focus on the emergence of new media and social networking in public diplomacy. The entire event will be moderated by Emmy-award winning journalist Frank Sesno, GW professor and incoming director of GW’s Columbian College of Arts and Sciences School of Media and Public Affairs; Marvin Kalb, James Clark Welling Presidential Fellow; and Blair Ruble, director of the Kennan Institute.

Panelists will examine the significance of the Kitchen Debate; what it represented in the dynamic of active Cold War ideological competition between the two superpowers; how it resonated with both the Americans and the Soviets; and what impact it had on the political fortunes of Nixon and Khrushchev. Taking part in the discussion will be historian Sergei Khrushchev (Nikita Khrushchev’s son), United Nations Association President and former U.S. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia and Venezuela William H. Leurs, New York Times columnist and former Richard Nixon speech writer William Safire, and numerous scholars and eyewitnesses to the Kitchen Debate.

In addition, a panel comprised of former exhibit guides and staff will discuss the landmark Sokolniki Exhibition, which brought a slice of American life — along with dozens of Russian-speaking American guides and exhibit staff — directly to the Soviet Union. The 1959 exhibition is credited with giving a human face and voice to America for a Soviet audience that had virtually no previous contact with the United States. During lunch, William Burns, under secretary of state for political affairs and former U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation, will deliver remarks.

The afternoon session will kick off with a presentation by New York University professor Clay Shirky, author of the acclaimed book Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organizations. In addition, panelists from business, government and the scholarly community will examine how today’s world of instant global communications affords the same opportunities to be innovative as the Moscow 1959 Exhibition. New School professor Nina Khruscheva and Adam Conner of Facebook, among others, will explore how to establish connections between the United States and the rest of the world through new media networks and will examine the role of digital technology and social networking in public diplomacy initiatives.

The conference will also feature the premiere of a short documentary film about the Kitchen Debate and the Sokolniki Exhibition, produced by Emmy award-winning director Nina Gilden Seavey, a GW professor and director of the University’s Documentary Center. In addition, a concept for a new multi-player online game about collaboration and diplomacy will be introduced. The game was created specially for the conference by a Duke University team led by Timothy Lenoir, a leading scholar and leader in bio-informatics and game-making.

GW’s Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communications is part of the University’s Columbian College of Arts and Sciences School of Media and Public Affairs and the Elliott School of International Affairs. The conference was made possible through partnerships with the Carnegie Corporation, the Walter Roberts Endowment, the Kennan Institute and the Blavatnik Family Foundation.

For more information about the conference and a complete list of speakers, visit www.gwu.edu/~smpa/events/faceoff/conference.htm .

For more information about GW’s School of Media and Public Affairs, visit www.smpa.gwu.edu .

For more information about GW’s Columbian College of Arts and Sciences, visit www.columbian.gwu.edu .

For more information about GW’s Elliott School of International Affairs, visit www.gwu.edu/~elliott .

For more news about The George Washington University, visit www.gwnewscenter.org .

UK MoD and Ainsworth’s first speech: An opportunity missed?

The UK’s new Minister of Defence, Bob Ainsworth, gave his first public speech on Wednesday 8 July at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), wordled below.  Now, Ainsworth, unlike his predecessors, has previous in the area of defence, as in he was Minister of State for the Armed Forces from June 2007, so he’s pretty much up to speed on what it’s all about.  Further, he’s known as a straight talker.

So his first speech as Minister of Defence could have been expected to be a no-nonsense justification of UK military operations and presence in Helmand, especially with casualty rates amongst his troops currently so appalingly high, which has given the media extra focus on Afghanistan.  The circumstances, unfortunate and saddening as they are, the timing and the platform gave an opportunity for the MoD to give heightened voice to a message which is not being heard by the British public, a message clearly articulating why the UK is doing what it’s doing, and suffering because of it, in a far off counry.

Indeed, Ainsworth was refreshingly forthright, admitting that the problems faced are grave and serious.  Further, he did attempt to show signs of a strategy, articulating several steps necessary, many already under way, to stabilise the situation and reach an ‘end state’, not an end date.  Indeed, he stated that ‘more lives will be lost and our resolve will be tested’ – no pulling of punches here.  In fact, that was the message received by the media, as scores of headlines, from the BBC to the tabloids reiterated the warning of further lives being lost.

Yet as to explaining why, an opportunity was missed.  Of the 2943 words of the speech, only 220 words, less than 10%, were invested in that crucial element of explaining why.  Any message explaining why it is vital that the UK continue to puts its people in harm’s way was drowned out, if really attempted at all.

The MoD itself seemed to be caught up in its own tight worldview, panglossian in its attempt to be seen to be  filling this yawning information gap.  As can be seen from its own website, despite the lack of real attempt to deal with the ‘why’ question, MoD were keen to portray the speech as one in which “Defence Secretary Bob Ainsworth has given a speech today explaining why the British Armed Forces are on operations in Afghanistan”.

Unfortunately he didn’t.  A fine speech it may have been, but it didn’t do what it says on the tin.

Of course it would be naive to think that good old-fashioned politics would merely allow such a speech to go ahead.  Yet politics is about power and influence and retaining it.  And modern democratic politics cannot achieve such things without an informed public.  With operations at high tempo, and serving personnel working bloody hard to achieve their objectives, and suffering in order to do so, the media ensures that Afghanistan remains in the spotlight in the eyes of the public.  Under this spotlight and with a new, straight talking Minister, there is a window of opportunity to articulate the governments reasons for pursuing such a difficult course, to inform its public so they may at least understand.  Those at Chatham House might understand (and remember this was a public speech – Chatham House was the location not the audience), CB3 might understand, most journalists might  understand, but the majority of the British public remain unclear as to why our Armed Forces are being asked to do what they are doing.  The window of opportunity for changing that won’t stay open for long.